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A Unique Bench, A Common Code: Evaluating
Judicial Ethics in Juvenile Court
MICHELE BENEDETTO NEITZ*

ABSTRACT
Recent cases involving ethical scandals on the juvenile court bench have
caught the interest of legal scholars, judges, practitioners, and the public. This
article proposes a new theoretical framework for assessing these problems and
articulates a series of vital ethical reforms.
Despite their distinct role in an atypical court, juvenile court judges are not
subject to unique ethical standards. Most jurisdictions have adopted the ABA
Model Code of Judicial Conduct as the ethical code guiding juvenile court
judges. However, this Model Code, intended to apply to any person in a
decision-making capacity, was created for a more conventional type of judging
than is expected from a juvenile court judge. Because these standards do not
address the exceptional roles and challenges facing juvenile court judges, the
potential for ethical violations and injustice is significant.
This article therefore recommends innovative textual revisions designed to
provide much-needed ethical guidance to juvenile court judges in three critical
areas: (1) ex parte communications; (2) competence; and (3) demeanor and
decorum. The implementation of ethical guidelines tailored for this specialized
court will remedy an existing flaw in the scheme of judicial ethics, while
reinforcing judges’ abilities to determine the best outcomes for troubled youth.

I. INTRODUCTION
Fourteen-year-old Tommy was arrested in 2007 for stealing loose change from
unlocked cars.1 The arresting police officer told Tommy’s mother that he would
likely receive probation for this minor offense. When two lawyers consulted by
Tommy’s mother confirmed that probation was the likely outcome of Tommy’s

* Associate Professor, Golden Gate University School of Law, San Francisco, California. J.D., New York
University School of Law. The author once worked as a law clerk for the Legal Aid Society in New York City
juvenile courts. I am grateful to Professor Deborah Rhode and Professor Sarah Cravens for their thoughtful
feedback on earlier drafts. I also thank my colleagues at Golden Gate University School of Law for their
support, particularly Eric Christiansen and Rachel Van Cleave, and research assistants Ellen Jenkins and Jaimie
Bombard. © 2010, Michele Benedetto Neitz.
1. Although the name has been changed, this case study was drawn from Plaintiffs’ Amended Class Action
Complaint, H.T. vs. Ciavarella, No. 3:09-cv-00357-ARC (M.D. Pa. 2009), available at http://www.jlc.org/files/
luzernecounty/Luzerne_complaint_Amended_04-23-09Final.pdf.
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juvenile court proceedings, she did not hire an attorney to represent her son.
During a three-minute hearing in which Tommy was not represented by an
attorney, juvenile court Judge Mark A. Ciavarella allegedly did not explain to
Tommy the significance of giving up the right to counsel and other legal rights by
pleading guilty. When Tommy pled guilty, he was ordered to spend twelve
months at a residential school. He was not assigned a grade level and was placed
in pre-GED classes. When he finally returned home, Tommy was held back a
grade; his resulting anxiety prevented him from later attending a traditional
school.
A twelve-month sentence for such a minor offense would be an astonishing
result in adult criminal court. However, Tommy’s case was only one of many
juvenile delinquency cases adjudicated by Judge Ciavarella in Luzerne County,
Pennsylvania, in which disproportionate sentences were imposed. Judge Ciavarella regularly sent one in four juvenile delinquents to detention facilities in a
jurisdiction where the usual rate for juveniles was one in ten.2
In early 2009, the mystery of Judge Ciavarella’s behavior on the bench was
solved: Judge Ciavarella and his co-conspirator, Judge Michael T. Conahan,
received millions of dollars from private detention facilities in exchange for
placing youth in those facilities.3 Both judges pled guilty and were sentenced to
eighty-seven months in prison.4 In March 2009, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania ordered the records of hundreds of youth sentenced by Judge Ciavarella to be
expunged.5
This tale of judicial corruption in Pennsylvania’s juvenile courts brought
significant media attention to the expansive discretionary powers of judges in
juvenile court. It is certainly an extreme example of unethical judicial behavior.
Many, if not most, juvenile court judges seek to perform their duties in an ethical
manner with great respect for the litigants in their courtrooms. Nevertheless,
juvenile court judges traditionally operate in a closed environment with minimal
public scrutiny.6 While the concept of judges exchanging juvenile court detention

2. John Schwartz, Clean Slates for Youth Sentenced Fraudulently, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2009, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/27/us/27judges.html. Youth advocacy groups often complained about the
unusually harsh nature of Judge Ciavarella’s adjudications. See Ian Urbina & Sean D. Hamill, Judges Plead
Guilty in Scheme to Jail Youth for Profit, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/
02/13/us/13judge.html.
3. Urbina & Hamill, supra note 2.
4. Dave Janoski, Disgraced Judge Ciavarella Calls Powell “Liar,” TIMES TRIB. (Scranton, Pa.), July 3, 2009,
available at http://thetimes-tribune.com/news/disgraced-judge-ciavarella-calls-powell-liar-1.102873?lo
calLinksEnabled⫽false.
5. See Schwartz, supra note 2.
6. Confidentiality laws prevent information about most juvenile court cases from reaching the public, and it
is therefore “critical that the juvenile court judge ensure that information about the juvenile court system is
made available to the public. Only in this way will the public receive a balanced view of the work of the juvenile
court and not rely solely on the spectacular headlines which appear at regular intervals.” Judge Leonard P.
Edwards, The Juvenile Court and the Role of the Juvenile Court Judge, 43 JUV. & FAM. CT. J., no. 2, 1992 at 29.
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placements for cash is likely an isolated incident, this case highlights the need for
a renewed focus on judicial ethics in juvenile court.
Juvenile court was designed over 100 years ago as a mechanism to improve
outcomes for delinquent youth. Its founders emphasized the rehabilitative
purpose of this special court; youthful offenders were to be treated, not
punished.7 In the modern era, juvenile courts exist in every jurisdiction. These
courts differ substantially from criminal courts involving the adjudication of
adult offenders. In addition to adjudicating individual cases, juvenile court judges
serve society as a whole. Lack of constructive early intervention in juvenile
delinquency cases can send youth down a path of longtime criminal conduct,
which has enormous costs for society.8
Despite their unique role in a unique court, juvenile court judges are not
subject to unique ethical standards. Rather, juvenile court judges are held to the
same standards intended to govern civil and criminal courts. These standards do
not address the special problems facing juvenile court judges. To address the lack
of guidance for juvenile court, state legislatures, individual courts, and advocacy
groups have filled in the gap with non-binding training materials and guidelines
specifically designed for juvenile court judges. Notwithstanding this apparent
understanding that juvenile court involves concerns that are not present in adult
court, there exists no uniform standard of conduct for juvenile court judges. The
failure of the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct to address the unique needs of
juvenile court judges has yet to be considered in academic literature.
This Article proposes the creation of critical provisions in the code of judicial
ethics to be applied to juvenile court. Although a complete examination of
juvenile court structure and disciplinary processes is beyond the scope of this
piece, the recommendations that follow are a necessary first step toward ensuring
both ethical guidance and accountability in juvenile court. Acknowledging that
the term “juvenile court” can encompass family court proceedings, child custody
proceedings, and other areas, this article’s focus will be juvenile delinquency
proceedings.
Part II traces the history of the juvenile court, including a review of the
Supreme Court’s constitutional framework for juvenile justice. Although juvenile
courts are currently moving toward a more punitive and less rehabilitative model,
the purpose, procedures, and outcomes of juvenile court remain different than
adult criminal court. Part III therefore considers the specialized role of juvenile
court, with particular attention paid to the structure of the court and the roles of its
judges. Part III also explores the distinctive challenges faced by juvenile court

7. See discussion infra Part II.A; see also Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and Reconstructing
the Legal Order: The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1083, 1098 (1991).
8. Mark A. Cohen & Alex R. Piquero, New Evidence on the Monetary Value of Saving a High Risk Youth, 25
J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY, No. 1, at 25, 47 (2009) (the “typical career criminal” imposes costs of
approximately $230,000 through age 14; over a lifetime, those costs aggregate to $5.7 million per criminal).
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judges.
Since nearly all states have substantially adopted the ABA Code of Judicial
Conduct as the ethical code applicable to juvenile court judges, Part IV examines
the suitability of applying this generic code of conduct to judges in these
specialized courts. A review of the history of judicial ethics demonstrates that
these standards were created for a more conventional type of judging than is
expected from a juvenile court judge.
Accordingly, Part V recommends revision of the ABA Code of Judicial
Conduct to reflect the special needs of juvenile court. As a starting point, this
article offers provisions to be included in a revised Code of Judicial Conduct for
juvenile court judges in three areas of particular importance: (1) ex parte
communications; (2) judicial competence; and (3) bias, judicial demeanor, and
decorum. These provisions will address grievous circumstances, such as those in
Judge Ciavarella’s courtroom, as well as provide guidance for ethical judges.
Moreover, implementation of a revised code of conduct for juvenile court judges
will increase public confidence in this atypical court.

II. THE EVOLVING HISTORY OF JUVENILE COURT
A. THE CREATION OF A UNIQUE COURT FOR CHILDREN

The history of juvenile courts is well-documented.9 The juvenile court
movement began during the “Progressive Era,” the period from 1880 to 1920
characterized by major social and structural changes in the United States.10 The
advent of industrialization and urbanization in the mid-nineteenth century,
coinciding with the breakdown of the traditional home and domestic life, raised
concern about youth who were “no longer governed by the traditional authority
of the family or other social institutions” and instead “took to the streets” for
work and entertainment.11
The motivations of the Progressive reformers who created juvenile courts are
somewhat conflicting. Middle-class and wealthy Progressives expressed concern
for the welfare of youth and fought for the salvation of children of broken
homes.12 At the same time, the social order required control of possible criminals

9. See generally, e.g., BARRY KRISBERG & JAMES F. AUSTIN, REINVENTING JUVENILE JUSTICE (1993); Solomon
J. Greene, Vicious Streets: The Crisis of the Industrial City and the Invention of Juvenile Justice, 15 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 135 (2003); Barry C. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court: Youthfulness, Criminal Responsibility, and
Sentencing Policy, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 68 (1997).
10. KRISBERG & AUSTIN, supra note 9, at 27. The reformists of this era implemented significant social
reforms, including the public defender movement, the increased use of mental and I.Q. testing, and the
“scientific study of crime.” Id.
11. Greene, supra note 9, at 136.
12. See KRISBERG & AUSTIN, supra note 9, at 30.
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who presented a potential threat to citizens and their own children.13 The
Progressives thus sought to construct a system which would rehabilitate
delinquent youth while preventing social unrest.14
The reformers turned to the philosophy of parens patrie, giving the state the
authority to act as a parent.15 Underlying this philosophy is the notion that
paternal action, rather than penal action, is the proper response to the problems of
juvenile crime and “urban crisis.”16 Accordingly, Illinois created the first juvenile
court in 1899 to address cases of delinquent, dependent, and neglected children.17
The court retained the authority to either place children in orphanages or foster
homes, or place children on probation.18 Unpaid probation officers, who were
initially middle-class female reformers, assisted judges in supervising youth.19
Within ten years of the creation of juvenile court in Illinois, ten states had
established similar courts. By 1925, all but two states had launched “specialized
courts for children.”20 These courts were commended for providing for the
“salvation” of children by “bringing [a child] into one of the courts of the state . . .
for the purpose of subjecting it to the state’s guardianship and protection.”21
Rather than viewing a court case in terms of resolving the “guilt” or “innocence”
of a child, reformers wanted a child in juvenile court “to feel that he is the object
of [the state’s] care and solicitude, not that he was under arrest or on trial.”22
Children were to be “treated and rehabilitated” through clinical, not punitive,
procedures.23
Yet because the adult penal system was “never completely off-limits for
children,” the risk of punishment was always a possibility.24 In this way, societal
fear of juveniles committing crimes undermined the rehabilitative nature of
juvenile court.25 As discussed below, this ambivalent approach to juvenile court
is still present today: A tension exists between the desire to rehabilitate and the

13. Feld, supra note 9, at 93. The resulting juvenile court movement, combining “social welfare and penal
social control,” has been criticized as the embodiment of “an inherent conceptual flaw and an innate
contradiction.” Id.
14. See KRISBERG & AUSTIN, supra note 9, at 29.
15. Edwards, supra note 6, at 4.
16. Greene, supra note 9, at 143.
17. KRISBERG & AUSTIN, supra note 9, at 30.
18. Id.
19. Greene, supra note 9, at 148; see also KRISBERG & AUSTIN, supra note 9, at 30.
20. KRISBERG & AUSTIN, supra note 9, at 30.
21. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48 (Pa. 1905) (internal citations omitted)).
22. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15 (1967) (citing Julian Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 119-20
(1909) (reformers “believed that society’s role was not to ascertain whether the child was ‘guilty’ or ‘innocent,’
but ‘[w]hat is he, how has he become what he is, and what had best be done in his interest and in the interest of
the state to save him from a downward career.’”)).
23. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 16.
24. Judge Jay D. Blitzman, Gault’s Promise, 9 BARRY L. REV. 67, 74 (2007) (citing Sanford J. Fox, The Early
History of the Court, 6 FUTURE OF CHILD 29 (1996)).
25. See id.
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desire to punish. Moreover, as reformers celebrated this “new age” of treatment
of children, they also reinforced the concept that social problems such as
delinquency could be solved through individual cases without broader social
reforms.26
As with every case-by-case analysis, however, outcomes in juvenile court were
heavily dependent on the perspectives of individual decision-makers. The
“hallmark” of juvenile court was the individual case disposition, designed to
address the needs of the juvenile.27 With the concept of a jury trial deemed
“irrelevant” to the central issue at hand, namely how best to treat but not punish a
child, the role of the juvenile court judge became increasingly important.28
Consequently, “judges were given almost limitless discretion . . . to facilitate
whatever the judge thought would ‘cure’ the youth.”29
However, critics of juvenile court condemned the “seemingly unlimited
discretion” of juvenile court judges.30 Specifically, they claimed that without
procedural due process and other constitutional protections, juvenile court
proceedings resulted in “arbitrary and capricious” judicial decisions.31 Advocates
argued in response that juvenile court judges acted with compassion, and focused
on rehabilitation and the “best interests” of the child.32 The debate over judicial
discretion and constitutional criminal protections in juvenile court ultimately
reached the Supreme Court in 1967.
B. THE SUPREME COURT’S CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR
JUVENILE COURT

In its landmark holding in In re Gault, the United States Supreme Court
modified the constitutional protections in juvenile court proceedings.33 Fifteenyear-old Gerald Francis Gault was picked up by the County Sheriff for making
telephone calls of the “irritatingly offensive, adolescent, sex variety.”34 His
family was not notified that he was taken into custody.35 At a hearing before a
juvenile court judge the next day, Gerald was not represented by an attorney.36

26. See KRISBERG & AUSTIN, supra note 9, at 31-32; see also Feld, supra note 9, at 94-95 (“‘Child-saving’
satisfied humanitarian impulses without engendering more fundamental social change.”).
27. See Ainsworth, supra note 7, at 1099.
28. See id. at 1101.
29. Id. at 1099.
30. See KRISBERG & AUSTIN, supra note 9, at 30.
31. Steven A. Drizin & Greg Luloff, Are Juvenile Courts a Breeding Ground for Wrongful Convictions?, 34
N. KY. L. REV. 257, 263 (2007).
32. Id. See generally Mack, supra note 22, at 120 (“The child who must be brought into court should, of
course, be made to know that he is face to face with the power of the state, but he should at the same time, and
more emphatically, be made to feel that he is the object of its care and solicitude.”).
33. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
34. Id. at 4.
35. Id. at 5.
36. Id.

2011]

JUDICIAL ETHICS IN JUVENILE COURT

103

No transcript, recording, or other record of the proceedings was created, and
Gerald was not able to confront his accuser.37 Using his discretion, the judge
sentenced Gerald “as a juvenile delinquent” to the State Industrial School until
age twenty-one.38
Because no appeal was allowed for Arizona juvenile cases, Gerald filed a
habeas corpus petition.39 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to
address the impact of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause upon
juvenile court proceedings. Although recognizing that “the highest motives and
most enlightened impulses led to a peculiar system for juveniles,” the Court
raised concerns about the broad judicial discretion provided to juvenile court
judges.40 Specifically, the Court noted that the history of juvenile court illustrated
that “unbridled discretion, however benevolently motivated, is frequently a poor
substitute for principle and procedure.”41 Without adequate procedures, juveniles
could be deprived of fundamental rights and denied due process.42
The Court thus took a new approach to juvenile court in Gault, initiating a
“patchwork jurisprudence of juveniles’ constitutional rights.”43 The Court
acknowledged the unique benefits of the juvenile system, but believed that the
imposition of due process standards would not disrupt such benefits.44 Accordingly, the Court held that a juvenile in court proceedings is entitled to those rights
that are necessary to fulfill the fundamental fairness guarantee of the Due Process
Clause: the right to counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses,
and the privilege against self-incrimination.45
The juvenile court judge in Gault used his judicial discretion to act like a judge
in adult criminal court. In particular, he focused only on those aspects of Gault’s
case that would support his decision to impose a six-year sentence. The Supreme
Court did not focus its opinion on judicial ethics, but instead imposed procedural
protections designed to constrain judicial discretion. The Court observed that the

37. Id. at 5, 7.
38. Id. at 7-8. Of note, an adult penalized for the same conduct would have received a fine of $5 to $50, or
imprisonment for not more than two months. Id. at 9-10.
39. Gault, 387 U.S. at 8.
40. Id. at 17-18.
41. Id. at 18. The Court further noted that “[t]he absence of substantive standards has not necessarily meant
that children receive careful, compassionate, individualized treatment.” Id.
42. Id. at 19 (quoting Paul S. Lehman, A Juvenile’s Right to Counsel in a Delinquency Hearing, 17 JUV. CT.
JUDGES J. 53, 54 (1966)).
43. Elisa Poncz, Rethinking Child Advocacy After Roper v. Simmons: “Kids are Just Different” and “Kids
are Like Adults” Advocacy Strategies, 6 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 273, 278 (2008).
44. Gault, 387 U.S. at 21-22. By way of example, the Court noted that the application of due process
requirements would not interfere with the juvenile offender’s classification as “delinquent” rather than
“criminal.” Id. at 23.
45. See id. at 1; see also Martin Guggenheim & Randy Hertz, Reflections on Judges, Juries, and Justice:
Ensuring the Fairness of Juvenile Delinquency Trials, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 553, 558 (1998) (“[T]he Gault
majority decreed that juveniles would enjoy only those constitutional rights necessary to implement the Due
Process Clause’s guarantee of ‘fundamental fairness.”’).
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“essential difference” between Gault’s juvenile court proceeding and an adult
criminal court proceeding is that “safeguards available to adults were discarded
in Gerald’s case.”46 Moreover, the facts of the Gault case demonstrate the
consequence of unethical behavior on the part of judges.
For example, the Gault Court carefully considered the juvenile judge’s
testimony about his decision-making process. The Court clearly expected a
juvenile court judge to make a “careful inquiry and judgment as to the possibility
that the boy could be disciplined and dealt with at home, despite his previous
transgressions.”47 Yet, the juvenile court judge’s testimony about Gault’s juvenile
court proceeding was “devoid of any meaningful discussion of this”; instead, the
judge concentrated on the same points which would be at issue in an adult
criminal court proceeding, such as Gault’s probationary status.48
The juvenile court judge’s failure to take into account all applicable evidence
in Gault raises ethical concerns of judicial incompetence.49 As discussed in Part
V (B), infra, competence is a critical component of judicial ethics. In addition, if
Gault’s juvenile court judge had focused more on true rehabilitation of this young
offender, rather than punishment, the Supreme Court perhaps would not have
been so concerned about juvenile court proceedings. Accordingly, this particular
judge’s unethical behavior, ignoring both evidence of a stable home and the
rehabilitative purpose of juvenile court, is arguably responsible for the sweeping
“due process revolution” imposed by the Supreme Court.50
With this decision, the Court moved juvenile court proceedings away from the
“guardianship and protection” ideal51 and closer to the format used in “adversary
criminal trials.”52 The shift did not go unnoticed; Justice Stewart warned in his
Gault dissent that the Court’s decision served to “convert a juvenile proceeding
into a criminal prosecution.”53
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the Supreme Court continued to develop the
application of constitutional rights—while ignoring judicial ethics—in relation to

46. Gault, 387 U.S. at 29.
47. Id. at 28.
48. Id. at 28 n.41.
49. See discussion of judicial competence, infra Part V.B.
50. The term “revolution” is used often by scholars examining In re Gault. See Blitzman, supra note 24, at 69
(“Gault appeared to herald a due process revolution in juvenile law.”); see also Perry Moriearty, Combating the
Color-Coded Confinement of Kids: An Equal Protection Remedy, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 285, 286
(2008) (“The so-called ‘Due Process Revolution’ of the 1960s led to the implementation of various
constitutional safeguards that had the unintended effect of transforming juvenile court proceedings from
informal, administrative hearings into full-blown prosecutions.”).
51. KRISBERG & AUSTIN, supra note 9, at 30 (quoting Commonwealth v. Fisher, 62 A. 198 (Pa. 1905) (internal
citations omitted)).
52. Gault, 387 U.S. at 78 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 79.
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juvenile court.54 Given the Court’s concern in Gault about judicial discretion in
juvenile court, and the resulting expansion of constitutional rights in the years
following Gault, it would have been a natural progression for the Court to impose
a jury trial requirement and remove judicial decision-making from such
proceedings. However, the Court refused to do so in 1971 in McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania.55
Joseph McKeiver, age sixteen, and Edward Terry, age fifteen, were separately
charged with criminal violations of Pennsylvania law.56 Their lawyers’ requests
for jury trials were denied.57 Different juvenile court judges, determining that the
youth were delinquent, denied their appeals.58
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on these cases as well as similar cases
from North Carolina to address the issue of whether jury trials are constitutionally required in juvenile court. In a plurality opinion, the Court conceded that the
“idealistic hopes” of the founders of juvenile court “have not been realized,” and
juvenile court judges often fell “far short of that stalwart, protective, and
communicating figure the system envisaged.”59
Despite such disappointments, the Court found that imposing a jury trial would
not remedy the “defects” in juvenile court and would not strengthen the
fact-finding function.60 Rather, the Court noted that a jury trial requirement
would remake the juvenile court hearing into an adversary proceeding like
criminal court, eroding informality and causing delay in what should be a
“protective” court.61 Furthermore, mandating jury trials would impede states
from experimenting on their own to improve their juvenile court systems.62 As a
result, the Court allowed states to provide jury trials, but stopped short of
requiring such action from all states.63
Some three decades later, approximately twenty percent of states required jury

54. See generally, e.g., Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966) (prior to Gault, the Court held a juvenile
was entitled to hearing with counsel before waiver to adult criminal court); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975)
(prohibition against double jeopardy prevents individual from being tried in both juvenile and adult criminal
court for same offense); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (constitutional safeguard of standard of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt is required in delinquency proceeding).
55. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
56. Id. at 534-35.
57. Id. at 535.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 543-44. To support this claim, the Court referenced a 1967 Presidential Task Force report finding
that half of juvenile court judges had not obtained undergraduate degrees, a fifth had obtained no college
education, and another fifth were not members of the bar. Id. at 544 n.4 (citing THE PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 7
(1967)).
60. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 528.
61. Id. at 528-29.
62. Id. at 547 (“The States, indeed, must go forward.”).
63. See Blitzman, supra note 24, at 84.
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trials in juvenile court.64 The discretion of the juvenile court judge is more
powerful in those states that do not mandate jury trials. Repeating a theme heard
in Gault, the McKeiver Court recognized the potential discrepancy inherent in a
system affording broad discretion to judges. The Court expressed “an appreciation for the juvenile court judge who is devoted, sympathetic, and conscientious”
while at the same time voiced concern about the judge who is “untrained and less
than fully imbued with an understanding approach to the complex problems of
childhood and adolescence.”65 The fact that two such judges could simultaneously decide cases involving young lives—often within the same courthouse—is indeed cause for concern.66 Yet the Supreme Court’s opinion in
McKeiver, while quoting extensively from a 1967 Presidential Task Force report
reciting the failures of juvenile court, neglected to even mention judicial ethics as
a potential remedy for its problems.67 Instead, the Court used conclusory
language to dismiss “abuses” in juvenile court as relating to “lack of resources
and of dedication rather than to inherent unfairness.”68 Even in a case
highlighting the distinct purpose of juvenile court, the Supreme Court failed to
recognize the potential of strengthening ethical oversight of judges.
As the Supreme Court expanded constitutional protections for participants in
juvenile court, the ideology of the Court itself began to shift. By aligning the
procedures of juvenile court more closely with adult criminal court, Supreme
Court jurisprudence “criminalized” the juvenile justice system.69 As the American public became frustrated with perceived leniency for criminal actions by

64. Id.
65. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 534. The Court’s reference to “untrained” and “less than fully imbued” judges
raises ethical issues of judicial competence.
66. A similar discrepancy exists today in immigration court. See generally Jaya Ramji-Nogales et. al.,
Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295 (2007); Michele Benedetto, Crisis
on the Immigration Bench: An Ethical Perspective, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 467 (2008).
67. Although the creation of ethical guidelines is traditionally within the realm of the ABA and State Bar
organizations, the Supreme Court does occasionally consider judicial ethics issues. See, e.g., Caperton v. A.T.
Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009) (judge should have recused himself as a matter of due process when
corporation that donated to his campaign appeared before him); Repub. Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765
(2002) (Minn. Canon of Judicial Conduct, which prohibited candidates for judicial election from announcing
their views or political issues, violated First Amendment); Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899 (1997) (judge
convicted of taking bribes from defendants in criminal cases is actual judicial bias); Liljeberg v. Health Servs.
Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847 (1988) (judge should have disqualified himself in proceeding in which his
impartiality might reasonably be questioned); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (judicial misconduct
did not render judge personally liable, despite the lack of formality).
68. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 547-48.
69. See generally Edwards, supra note 6, at 7 (“Since the Gault case the criminalization of the juvenile courts
has continued.”); see also Alexes Harris, Diverting and Abdicating Judicial Discretion: Cultural, Political, and
Procedural Dynamic in California Juvenile Justice, 41 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 387, 393 (2007) (“Thirty years after
the ‘constitutional domestication’ of the juvenile court, a more punitive approach to crime and justice
increasingly guides the juvenile system.”) (internal citations omitted).
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youthful offenders,70 juvenile arrests for violent crime increased sixty-two
percent from 1988 to 1994.71 With the public demanding “adult time for adult
crimes,”72 legislative changes sought to treat juveniles more like adult offenders.73 At the same time, state legislators amended the purpose clauses of state
statutes defining juvenile court to include words such as “punishment” and
“accountability,”74 and prosecutors played an increased role in court proceedings.75

III. THE SPECIALIZED ROLE OF JUVENILE COURT
Despite a decline in juvenile arrests for violent crime between 1994 and
2008,76 the shift away from rehabilitation continued in juvenile court. Although
inherent tensions between the rehabilitative and penal purposes of juvenile court
have always existed, juvenile court is now viewed by some observers as
employing a more punitive model, less focused on the “best interests” of a
child.77 In light of this ideological transition, the distinction between juvenile
court and adult criminal court has blurred. Indeed, numerous scholars have
addressed the evolving nature of juvenile court, sparking debates over procedural
reform, constitutional reform, and even the abolition of juvenile court entirely.78
However, while the differences between these courts are certainly narrower
than Progressive reformers envisioned, juvenile delinquency court continues to

70. Randi-Lynn Smallheer, Sentence Blending and the Promise of Rehabilitation: Bringing the Juvenile
Justice System Full Circle, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 259, 271-72 (1999).
71. NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY GUIDELINES:
IMPROVING COURT PRACTICE IN JUVENILE DELINQUENCY CASES 13 (Spring 2005) [hereinafter JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY GUIDELINES].
72. Drizin & Luloff, supra note 31, at 265.
73. Smallheer, supra note 70, at 272. These reforms include relaxing restrictions regarding transfer of
juveniles to adult courts, lowering the maximum age for jurisdiction in juvenile court, raising the maximum age
for retaining a youth in a juvenile institution, using adult correctional facilities in sentencing, and imposing
identical sentences on youth and adults convicted for the same offense. Id. (citing Hon. Lawrence L. Koontz, Jr.,
Reassessment Should Not Lead to Wholesale Rejection of the Juvenile Justice System, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 179,
180 (1997)).
74. JUVENILE DELINQUENCY GUIDELINES, supra note 71, at 12.
75. For example, prosecutors can “defer prosecution if a child successfully completes a program of
community service or counseling.” Edwards, supra note 6, at 8. Prosecutors were “once unwanted and
unnecessary in the juvenile court,” but have since become “an integral part of its operation.” Id. at 7.
76. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, STATISTICAL BRIEFING
BOOK (2009), available at http://www.ojjdp.ncjrs.gov/ojstatbb/crime/JAR_Display.asp?ID⫽qa05201.
77. See, e.g., Drizin & Luloff, supra note 31, at 265 (discussing a “wave of draconian new laws” that has
“resulted in a more punitive justice system” for juveniles); Randi-Lynn Smallheer, supra note 70, at 273 (“The
states’ efforts to ‘crack down’ on juvenile crime thus reflect a shift toward more retributive sentencing
policies.”); see also Blitzman, supra note 24, at 77 (2007) (“To protect public safety, some juveniles are
transferred [to criminal court] and are treated as adults.”).
78. Feld, supra note 9, at 93. Contra Blitzman, supra note 24, at 94 (2007) (“Given the fact that it has been
estimated that fifty percent of the juvenile court’s subject matter involves care and protection and status offense
cases, the compartmentalization that Feld recommends is problematic.”).
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serve a specialized role in the criminal justice system. Central to this role is the
fact that cases adjudicated in juvenile court always involve minors, a group
deemed less culpable than their adult counterparts.
A. JUVENILE OFFENDERS ARE “DIFFERENT”: ROPER V. SIMMONS AND
GRAHAM V. FLORIDA

The Supreme Court acknowledged the unique situations of juvenile offenders
in two recent cases, Roper v. Simmons and Graham v. Florida. In Roper, the
Court considered whether execution of individuals under the age of eighteen at
the time of the offense violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.79 At age
seventeen, as a junior in high school, Christopher Simmons murdered a woman in
Missouri.80 He was tried as an adult, found guilty, and sentenced to death.81 The
Supreme Court precedent applicable at the time was Stanford v. Kentucky, in
which a divided court upheld the constitutionality of the death penalty for
juvenile offenders over age fifteen but under age eighteen.82
The Court chose to reconsider this issue in the case of Christopher Simmons.
The Court framed its discussion with an analysis of the three main differences
between juveniles and adults. First, the Court considered scientific and sociological evidence demonstrating that “a lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense
of responsibility” are more often found in youth than in adults, resulting in
“impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions.”83 Second, juveniles are
more vulnerable to negative influences, including peer pressure, and have less
control over their personal environments.84 Third, the characters of juveniles are
not as formed as adults but instead have more “transitory” personality traits.85
These factors suggested that juveniles “have a greater claim than adults to be
forgiven for failing to escape negative influences in their whole environment.”86
As a result, the case for retribution is not as compelling.87
The “marked” differences between juveniles and adults caused the majority of
states—and nearly every other country in the world—to reject the execution of
juveniles.88 Recognizing this trend, the Supreme Court concluded that the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments forbid imposition of the death penalty on individu-

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
Id. at 556.
Id. at 557-58.
Id. at 551 (citing Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370-71 (1989)).
Id. (internal citations omitted).
Roper, 543 U.S. at 569.
Id. at 570.
Id.
Id. at 571.
Id. at 572.
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als for crimes committed under the age of eighteen.89 The Roper Court’s analysis
is notable not only for its reliance on scientific evidence to support its holding,
but also because it arguably represents a jurisprudential shift away from a
punitive approach to juvenile justice.90
This shift continued with the Court’s reasoning in Graham v. Florida, in which
the Court considered whether imposition of a life sentence without parole on a
juvenile for a non-homicidal crime violates the cruel and unusual punishment
prohibitions of the Constitution.91 Following the logic of Roper, the Court held
that the Eighth Amendment forbids the sentence of life without parole for a
juvenile offender who did not commit a homicide.92 The Court noted that
developments in psychology and brain development since Roper “continue to
show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds.”93 Hence,
imposing a sentence of life without parole would deny a juvenile the “chance to
demonstrate growth and maturity.”94
For purposes of this discussion, the Court’s ongoing acknowledgment that
juvenile offenders deserve different treatment than adults reinforces the need for
a unique court to handle juveniles. Even more significantly, the Court’s analysis
in both Roper and Graham emphasizes the importance of understanding the
developmental and psychological issues relevant to juvenile delinquency. The
sensitivity to these issues expressed by the Court is the type of sensitivity all
juvenile court judges must possess to be effective.95
B. THE STRUCTURE OF JUVENILE COURT

Despite its increased “criminalization,” juvenile court remains a court like no
other.96 While most adult criminal courts are focused entirely on deterrence and
punishment, juvenile court retains the goal of “identifying the underlying issues
causing the delinquent behavior and providing interventions to address these
issues.”97 The rehabilitative component is therefore much more important in
juvenile court.98 As a consequence, structural and procedural differences exist

89. Roper, 543 U.S. at 578. With this holding, the Supreme Court moved away from its analysis in Stanford
toward a less harsh model of juvenile justice: “These considerations mean Stanford v. Kentucky should be
deemed no longer controlling on this issue.” Id. at 574. A similar Supreme Court shift had occurred three terms
earlier in the context of the death penalty for the mentally retarded. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
90. See generally Poncz, supra note 43.
91. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
92. Id. at 2018.
93. Id. at 2013.
94. Id. at 2017.
95. See infra discussion of judicial competence, Part V.B.
96. Edwards, supra note 6, at 7. For a discussion of adult problem-solving courts, see infra Part IV.B.
97. JUVENILE DELINQUENCY GUIDELINES, supra note 71, at 21 (2005).
98. One juvenile court judge explained that “my purpose is to rehabilitate” but “downtown in adult criminal
court their purpose is to punish.” Telephone Interview with Martina Peterson, Mo. Juvenile Court Comm’r (Jan.
21, 2010).
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between adult and juvenile court.99
In an attempt to reduce the stigma attached to juvenile court adjudications, the
courts employ distinctive terminology. Charges are brought as “petitions” instead
of “complaints” or “indictments,” and “trials” are called “jurisdictional hearings.”100 Young offenders are referred to as “minors” or “delinquents,” not
“defendants” or “criminals,” and convicted juvenile offenders receive “dispositions,” rather than “sentences.”101 In California, juvenile court is the only
division of superior court required by statute to have a presiding judge
supervising administrative matters.102 Also, with some exceptions, the proceedings and records of juvenile court are not publicly available.103 Unlike criminal
court convictions, juvenile court records in some cases can be sealed from public
view when the minor turns eighteen.104
Some state statutes reinforce the juvenile court’s duty to act in the best interests
of the child,105 while others emphasize the court’s responsibility to act in a
parental role. But the best illustration of juvenile court as “different” can be found
in the greater discretion of the juvenile court judge. As one judge commented, “I
need to be more involved than I ever would in civil court. How do I make a
decision [for a youth] that is personally, legally, and socially appropriate?”106
In addition, juvenile court judges have a wide variety of sentencing options.
For example, juvenile offenders can be placed on informal or formal probation.107 A judge can also impose disposition alternatives such as counseling,
mental health, or community service.108 For more serious offenses, judges may
choose from an array of out-of-home placement options, including juvenile hall,
county camps, residential treatment programs, or state juvenile justice authori-

99. Edwards, supra note 96, at 5 (Although each state’s juvenile court is “unique in the way it is structured,”
there are “substantial similarities in the ways in which juvenile courts in all jurisdictions function.”).
100. See id. at 6.
101. See id.; see also In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 23-25 (A benefit of the juvenile court procedure is to classify
the juvenile offender as a “delinquent” rather than as a “criminal,” yet this term currently involves only slightly
less stigma.); Poncz, supra note 43, at 285.
102. CENTER FOR FAMILIES, CHILDREN & THE COURTS, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY COURT ASSESSMENT 14 (2008),
available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/programs/cfcc/pdffiles/JDCA2008CombinedV1V2.pdf [hereinafter
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY COURT ASSESSMENT]; see also CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 246 (West 2009).
103. CAL WELF. & INS. CODE § 676(a) (West 2009) (“Unless requested by the minor . . . the public shall not
be admitted to a juvenile court hearing.”). The statute provides exceptions for hearings related to specific
crimes, including murder, arson, and robbery, which are opened to the public.
104. See CAL WELF. & INS. CODE § 781 (West 2009).
105. See id. at 6 n.20 (citing, by way of example, GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-35 (West 2009); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 27-20-31 (West 2009); VT. STAT. ANN. 33, § 5101 (West 2009)).
106. Interview with the Honorable Donna Hitchens, Supervising Judge, S.F. Unified Family Court, S.F., Cal.
(Aug. 6, 2009).
107. Id.
108. See generally JUVENILE DELINQUENCY GUIDELINES, supra note 71, at 148-49 (discussing disposition
sentencing options such as community service, referring youth to mental health agencies for treatment, or
substance-abuse counseling and therapy).

2011]

JUDICIAL ETHICS IN JUVENILE COURT

111

ties.109
To accomplish the goals of juvenile court, the judge’s role “combines judicial,
administrative, collaborative, and advocacy components.”110 The juvenile court
itself is part of a wide-ranging structure with multiple participants, including not
only lawyers, police, probation officers and court staff, but also parents, families,
schools, and community organizations.111 Many delinquency cases can be
informally resolved by one or more members of this broader system, leaving
room for juvenile court judges to hear only the most serious cases.112 In the
determination of a case, a judge must consider information available from legal
proceedings, probation reports, social service agency reports, and from the
parties (including family members) as well as attorneys.113
Notwithstanding these many players, it is often the juvenile court judge who is
held accountable by the public for any “failings” in this system.114 In addition to
his or her adjudicative duties, the juvenile court judge must therefore provide
leadership to educate the community about the challenges and needs of juvenile
court.115
As part of this nontraditional role, judges must ensure resources and services
are available for at-risk children and families.116 To do so, juvenile court judges
have a “greater responsibility than other judges to know the resources available in
the county in which they serve.”117 Judges should also guarantee that cooperation
exists among schools, probation officers, and other members of the system.118

109. Interview with the Honorable Donna Hitchens, supra note 106; see also E-mail from Martina Peterson,
Mo. Juvenile Court Comm’r (Jan. 21, 2010) (on file with The Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics) for a
discussion of Missouri’s “range of options” of placements for delinquent youth, including probation,
county-operated residential treatment programs, private residential facilities, and state-operated community and
residential treatment programs.
110. Edwards, supra note 96, at 25.
111. Id. at 8.
112. Id. at 27.
113. See id. at 26.
114. Id. at 27.
115. See, e.g., CAL. R. CT., Standard 5.40(e) (2009), available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/rules/
index.cfm?title⫽standards&linkid⫽standard5_40. Standard 5.40(e)(7) provides that juvenile court judges
should “[e]ducate the community and its institutions through every available means, including the media,
concerning the role of the juvenile court in meeting the complex needs of at-risk children and their families.” Id.
See generally Edwards, supra note 6, at 29 (juvenile court judges should provide “to the community information
about how well the juvenile court is completing the tasks assigned to it”).
116. See, e.g., CAL. R. CT., Standard 5.40(e) (2009), available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/rules/
index.cfm?title⫽standards&linkid⫽standard5_40 (“Judges of the juvenile court . . . are encouraged to . . .
take an active part in the formation of a communitywide network to promote and unify private and public sector
efforts to focus attention and resources for at-risk children and their families.”).
117. Interview with the Honorable Donna Hitchens, supra note 106.
118. See, e.g., CAL. R. CT. 5.40(e)(4) (2009), available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/rules/
index.cfm?title⫽standards&linkid⫽standard5_40 (“Judges of the juvenile court . . . are encouraged to . . .
exercise a leadership role in the development and maintenance of permanent programs of interagency
cooperation and coordination among the court and the various public agencies that serve at-risk children and
their families.”). Generally, the California Standard of JudicialAdministration directs judges to do a great deal of work in
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These judicial activities promote community involvement and “advance the
administration of justice” in juvenile courts.119
C. THE PATH TO THE JUVENILE COURT BENCH

In spite of their unique roles, juvenile court judges reach their positions on the
bench in much the same way other judges do. Accordingly, procedures for
appointment to the bench vary widely by jurisdiction. For example, in California,
where state judges are either elected or appointed by a governor, the path to
juvenile court starts with service on the superior court bench.120 As judges, these
individuals work in a range of courts, including civil, criminal, and juvenile
courts.121 Assignment to an individual court is within the discretion of the
presiding judge of superior court.122 In Missouri, depending on the county,
juvenile court judges are either appointed by the governor or elected.123 Each
county in the state of Texas has a “juvenile board,” which performs oversight
functions for local juvenile justice systems and designates which judges will sit
as juvenile court judges.124 In New York, juvenile court judges are publicly
elected to the bench through a network of independent screening panels.125
Some juvenile court judges specifically request a permanent assignment to
juvenile courtrooms. Others view an assignment in juvenile court as a necessary
first step for higher judicial office.126 A 2008 study of juvenile courts in
California found that most judges had long tenures working in juvenile

the community. Id. No other state has such a standard. E-mail from anonymous California retired juvenile court judge
(Feb. 1, 2010) (on file with The Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics). For additional examples of judicial activism
beyond the traditional bench duties, see Edwards, supra note 96, at 30-31.
119. Hon. Arthur L. Burnett, Sr., What of the Future? Envisioning an Effective Juvenile Court, 15-SPG CRIM.
JUST. 6, 13 (2000).
120. Interview with the Honorable Donna Hitchens, supra note 106.
121. See Harris, supra note 69, at 399.
122. Interview with the Honorable Donna Hitchens, supra note 106. Different jurisdictions use various terms
to describe juvenile court adjudicators, including “magistrates,” “hearing officers,” “masters,” and “associate
judges.” JUVENILE DELINQUENCY GUIDELINES, supra note 71, at 31-32. In some jurisdictions, judicial “referees”
or “commissioners” perform comparable duties to judges but are assigned to specific courtrooms. Harris, supra
note 69, at 399.
123. Telephone Interview with Martina Peterson, supra note 98. Missouri juvenile court benches are filled by
judges and commissioners. Commissioners are selected by en banc panel of circuit court judges, and their
selection must be approved by the governor. MO. REV. STAT. § 487.020(1), available at http://www.moga.mo.gov/
statutes/C400-499/4870000020.htm.
124. TEXAS YOUTH COMM’N, OVERVIEW OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM IN TEXAS (2009), http://
www.tyc.state.tx.us/about/overview.html.
125. N.Y. UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM, COURT RULES OF THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE § 150.1, available at
http://www.nycourts.gov/rules/chiefadmin/150.shtml. The independent screening panels consist of persons
selected by judges, including non-lawyers, as well as members of various bar associations. Id. In New York,
juvenile delinquency cases are heard by Family Court judges. See Juvenile Delinquency, N.Y. CITY FAM. CT.,
http://www.nycourts.gov/courts/nyc/family/faqs_juvenile.shtml (last visited Oct. 7, 2010).
126. See Harris, supra note 69, at 399-400. There are similar differences for lawyers in juvenile court. In
some jurisdictions, such as San Francisco, it is deemed a privilege for experienced district attorneys and public
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delinquency.127 One-half of the judges reported serving in their current delinquency assignment for three years or more.128 Significantly, sixty-two percent of
judicial officers had been attorneys practicing juvenile law before they came to
the bench.129 Judicial officers reported that they had spent an average of
twenty-two hours in “specialized training related to juvenile delinquency,
dependency, and related subjects” the year before.130 Notably, the study did not
report on any training related to judicial ethics. About half of the judicial officers
indicated that they experience one or more “work-related barriers” to attending
trainings, such as difficulty covering the time spent away from the bench and
budget concerns.131
San Francisco juvenile court judges regularly attend in-house trainings, in
addition to annual classes given by California’s Center for Judicial Education and
Research.132 New judges in San Francisco are required to attend the annual
Juvenile Law Institute for Judges. Similarly, in Missouri, family court judges and
commissioners must attend mandatory training every year, including Juvenile
Justice Education trainings.133 However, many of these trainings do not focus on
ethics.134
This level of expertise and experience has both positive and negative aspects
for participants in the challenging environment of juvenile court. On one hand,
juvenile court judicial officers appear to be some of the most experienced and
trained bench officers in any specialized court.135 This suggests that juveniles
appearing in delinquency court could have the benefit of a judge who understands
both the law and the considerable array of sentencing options available to
individual minors. Many judges who prefer to work in juvenile court do so with a
sense of dedication to “working with young people.”136

defenders to be assigned to juvenile court. Interview with Anonymous Public Defender, S.F., Cal. (June 30,
2009). As a result, the quality of lawyering in the San Francisco juvenile court is extremely high. Id.
127. JUVENILE DELINQUENCY COURT ASSESSMENT, supra note 102, at 75. This study was the judiciary’s first
“comprehensive research study of how the superior courts of California handle delinquency matters.” Id. at 1.
The study reported that the median length of judicial experience for judges, commissioners, and referees was
11.5 years. Id. at 74. The term “judicial officers” used herein will refer to judges, referees, and commissioners.
128. Id. at 74.
129. Id. at 75.
130. Id. This amount of training is a sharp contrast to other judicial officers in the United States. For
example, substantive training for immigration judges was cancelled in 2008 due to budget constraints. See
Benedetto, supra note 66, at 486.
131. JUVENILE DELINQUENCY COURT ASSESSMENT, supra note 102, at 75.
132. Interview with the Honorable Donna Hitchens, supra note 106; see also CAL R. CT. 10.50 (2010).
133. Telephone interview with Martina Peterson, supra note 98. For more about Juvenile Justice Education
in Missouri, see Juvenile Justice Education, YOUR MO. CTS., http://www.courts.mo.gov/page.jsp?id⫽2284 (last
visited Oct. 12, 2010).
134. Telephone interview with Anonymous Missouri Juvenile Court Commissioner (Jan. 21, 2010).
135. Contra Benedetto, supra note 66, at 486 (“[T]raining conferences for immigration judges were
completely suspended for several years due to budgetary constraints.”).
136. Harris, supra note 69, at 404-05.
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There are, however, downsides to experience. Judges could develop subtle
biases from hearing multiple cases, since “[j]udges who sit for years in a criminal
or juvenile court tend to hear the same stories over and over.”137 Examples
include gun possession cases in which a juvenile claims he or she simply “found”
the gun, drug possession cases in which a juvenile claims the “police planted the
drugs,” or assault cases with a claim of self-defense.138 Judges who repeatedly
hear these defenses “cannot help but be skeptical when yet another . . . juvenile
respondent comes forward with the same story.”139
Judges also draw diverse lessons from their experience, not all of which serve
the principles underlying juvenile court. For example, sociologist Alexes Harris’
2007 study of juvenile courts in Southern California found a “discordant bench”
in which “the ways final case outcomes were decided varied” depending on
whether judges had a “rehabilitative” or “literalist” (i.e., punitive) view of
juvenile court.140 The study concluded that judges focusing on the rehabilitative
aspect of juvenile court are likely to consider “individualized assessments of
youth” and prioritize “treatment as an outcome.”141 By contrast, judges with a
literalist view of juvenile court tend to view delinquent minors as youthful
offenders requiring “serious punishment” beyond the scope of juvenile court.142
These “competing notions of the substantive aims” of juvenile court raise
concerns—similar to those raised by the Supreme Court in McKeiver—about
inconsistencies in outcomes.143
Of course, inconsistent decision-making is possible in any court. In light of the
historic tension between the juvenile court’s dual purposes of rehabilitation and
punishment, some judicial discrepancy should be expected. However, if juvenile
court judges have starkly opposing views of the very purpose of the court itself
(and by extension their roles on the bench), this could impair public confidence in
the consistency and fairness of the process.144
This point is particularly critical because juvenile court presents practical
challenges to those who operate in its courtrooms. Judges in delinquency court
are “on the front-line, dealing with some of society’s most difficult problems.”145
As they decide individual cases, these judges must balance their statutory
obligations with the needs of both juvenile offenders and victims. As they
contemplate the best interests of a minor, judges must also consider community

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 45, at 574.
Id.
Id. at 575.
Harris, supra note 69, at 405-06.
Id. at 403.
Id. at 402.
Id. at 406.
See generally id.
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY GUIDELINES, supra note 71, at 14 (Spring 2005).

2011]

JUDICIAL ETHICS IN JUVENILE COURT

115

safety.146
This balancing act has become even more important in recent years in some
jurisdictions that allow juvenile dispositions to affect adult criminal court
sentences.147 For example, the California Supreme Court recently determined
that juvenile adjudications can be counted as “strikes” for purposes of the three
strikes law when an offender reaches adulthood.148 Accordingly, proceedings in
juvenile court can have significant consequences later in a youth’s life.
D. CHALLENGES FACING JUVENILE COURT JUDGES

With increasing weight placed on juvenile court adjudications, it is even more
essential for juvenile courts to have sufficient resources to balance the many
considerations confronting a juvenile court judge. However, juvenile courts are
notoriously “understaffed and overworked.”149 In some jurisdictions, they lack
resources and positions because the juvenile court is “perceived as less
important.”150 In the current economic climate, juvenile courts suffering from
heavy budget cuts and staff furloughs may also lose innovative juvenile court
programs.151
Heavy judicial caseloads take a toll on both judges and court participants. For
judges, an excessive docket makes it “difficult to spend the time you want on
each case.”152 For youth offenders, parents, victims and other community
members, a court process that is “hurried and disorganized [makes] them feel as

146. See id.
147. See, e.g., Ryle v. State, 842 N.E. 2d 320, 321-24 (Ind. 2005) (juvenile adjudications are reliable enough
to be deemed “prior convictions” and can serve as the basis for enhancing an adult criminal sentence); State v.
Hitt, 42 P.3d 732, 740 (Kan. 2002) (juvenile adjudications need not be charged in an indictment or proven to a
jury beyond a reasonable doubt before they can be used in calculating a defendant’s criminal history score under
the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act); State v. McFee, 721 N.W.2d 607, 615 (Minn. 2006) (“[I]t is not
inconsistent with the legislature’s purpose in maintaining the juvenile justice system for sentencing courts to use
prior juvenile adjudications in calculating criminal history under the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines.”); State
v. Harris, 118 P.3d 236, 243-44, 246 (Or. 2005) (juvenile adjudications can increase sentences for adult felons so
long as the existence of the prior juvenile adjudication is proved to a jury in the current case).
148. See People v. Nguyen, 209 P.3d 946, 949, 959 (Cal. 2009).
149. Edwards, supra note 96, at 26.
150. Id. at 26; see also id. at 35 (“[J]uvenile court often occupies low status in the legal community . . . [t]he
low status is . . . related to the fact that there is very little money to be made in juvenile court.”).
151. Interview with the Honorable Donna Hitchens, supra note 106; see also, e.g., S.C. DEPT. OF JUVENILE
JUSTICE, REPORT ON PROGRESS 2009 (2009), available at http://www.state.sc.us/djj/pdfs/2009-chinn-report.pdf
(addressing a twenty-three percent budget cut to the Department of Juvenile Justice in South Carolina, resulting
in the elimination of approximately 200 full time staff positions, mandatory ten-day furloughs for all employees,
and the elimination of all group homes and community based alternative placements); Press Release,
Multnomah County Oregon Department of Community Justice, Multnomah County’s Juvenile Justice
Innovations Threatened by Budget Cuts 2 (Jan. 9, 2004), available at http://www.co.multnomah.or.us/dcj/
Detention_reform_Detention_reform_press_conference0104.pdf (stating that the Department of Community
Justice has lost up to seventy percent in state funding, despite innovative and effective programs).
152. Interview with the Honorable Donna Hitchens, supra note 106.
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if their case is just being mechanically processed.”153 This is particularly
significant because of the different “mission” of juvenile court—judges are
expected to consider more than simply the facts of an offense to determine the
best placement for a child.154
Another compromising influence may be personal ambition. The Harris study
found that an “important aim” among judges was to retain their current
positions155 or achieve promotions that would “lead them beyond the juvenile
court.”156 They “sought to create reputations that would generate prestige and
connections to elected [office].”157 Participants in the study were concerned
about public perception of their judging abilities, including the expectations of
police, the media, and government agencies.158 Such considerations may force
excessive attention to how cases will play in the public eye. Judges “who are
afraid [for their reputations] are heavy sentencers.”159 Consequently, a judge’s
own career aspirations can have a significant influence on his or her determinations in juvenile court. Nevertheless, the current judicial ethics scheme does not
recognize these challenges of juvenile court.

IV. THE ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND JUVENILE COURT JUDGES
The American Bar Association Code of Judicial Conduct is designed to be a
model code, and as such it has no binding legal effect unless jurisdictions adopt
elements of the Code by statute or court rule.160 Although the Code itself does not
have the “force of law or regulation,” it reflects a “judicial consensus regarding
appropriate behavior” and is influential in “giving content to the constitutional
standards under which disciplinary proceedings are charged.”161
Nearly all states have substantively adopted the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct
in its entirety as the ethical code for juvenile court judges.162 The ABA Code thus
provides uniformity between jurisdictions and forms “the foundation for a

153. JUVENILE DELINQUENCY COURT ASSESSMENT, supra note 102, at 63.
154. Interview with the Honorable Donna Hitchens, supra note 106.
155. Harris, supra note 69, at 399.
156. Id. at 404.
157. See id. at 399.
158. See id. at 400.
159. Interview with the Honorable Donna Hitchens, supra note 106.
160. See JAMES J. ALFINI ET. AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS § 1.03, 1-6 (4th ed. 2007).
161. Kloepfer v. Comm’n on Judicial Performance, 49 Cal. 3d. 826, 838 n.6 (1989) (affirming an expectation
that judges will comply with the Code).
162. See CAL. CODE OF JUD. ETHICS (West 2010); CO. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT (West 2009); FLA. STAT. ANN.,
CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT (West 2010); ILL. COMP. STAT., CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT (West 2010); MD. RULES OF CT.,
Rule 16-813 (2008); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 3, § 3:09 (West 2009); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN., CODE OF JUD.
CONDUCT (West 2009); N.J. RULES OF CT., APP. to part 1 (West 2009); N.Y. JUD. LAW, BOOK 29 APP. (McKinney
2008); N.C. GEN. STAT., CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT (West 2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN., CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT
(West 2009); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. B (West 2009); VA. CODE ANN., CANONS OF JUD.
CONDUCT (West 2009).
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national body of law concerning judicial conduct.”163
The current ABA Code of Judicial Conduct Preamble starts with the premise
that “an independent, fair, and impartial judiciary is indispensable to our system
of justice.”164 All judges are required to make competent decisions, free from
bias or prejudice.165 Judges are obligated to promote the independence, integrity,
and impartiality of the judiciary, and avoid both impropriety and the appearance
of impropriety.166
A. THE ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The ABA Code of Judicial Conduct was an outgrowth of canons created for a
more traditional type of judging than is appropriate for a juvenile court judge.
Like most American legal standards, the Code drew on experience under English
common law. Although societies generally have sought “to assure the impartiality
of the judges who held sway over them,” English kings believed it was their royal
right to remove any judge who refused to consult with them in the process of
deciding cases.167 Such royal prerogatives were incompatible with the ideal of an
independent judge who could protect citizens against royal abuse.168
Following the revolution, the American founders responded to perceived
inadequacies of the pre-Revolution judiciary. Specifically, the framers sought to
minimize the potential for undue influence on judges in the United States. This
condition required life tenure for federal judges, who could be removed from the
bench only through the impeachment process.169
In the first few decades of the twentieth century, the judiciary came under
attack by progressive reformers and legal realists.170 Judges were condemned as
corrupt members of the privileged class who stood in the way of reform

163. ALFINI ET AL., supra note 160, § 1.03, 1-7.
164. ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT pmbl. (2007), available at http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/
ABA_MCJC_approved.pdf.
165. ALFINI ET AL., supra note 160, § 3.01, 3-2.
166. ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 (2007), available at http://www.abanet.org/
judicialethics/ABA_MCJC_approved.pdf.
167. Randall T. Shepard, Campaign Speech: Restraint and Liberty in Judicial Ethics, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
1059, 1060 (1996).
168. See id. at 1061-62 (This conflict led to “such epic events as the removal of Chief Justice Coke for his
refusal to promise that he would consult with King James.”).
169. See id. at 1062. Impeachment is a time-consuming process with extreme results, and procedures became
necessary to deal with lesser judicial misconduct. Congress eventually developed a method for lesser
punishment of federal judges who do not deserve removal from the bench. See id. at 1063; see also Judicial
Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-458, 94 Stat. 2035, 2038-9
(1980) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 331, 332, 372 (1981)); ALFINI ET AL., supra note 160, § 1.04, 1-9 (Impeachment
procedures “provide[] for only one sanction—the draconian penalty of removal—which was not appropriate for
all or even most cases of judicial misbehavior.”).
170. See generally Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Tradeoffs of Candor: Does Judicial Transparency
Erode Legitimacy?, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 497, 514-16 (2009).

118

THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS

[Vol. 24:97

legislation.171 As public outcry against judges increased, the American Bar
Association attempted to respond to this “perceived crisis in confidence in the
judiciary.”172 In 1924, the ABA adopted the model Canons of Judicial Ethics.173
The Canons were drafted by the ABA’s Committee on Judicial Ethics, led by
Chief Justice William Howard Taft. The Committee created thirty-four Canons
designed to be “an ideal guide of behavior, rather than an enforceable set of
rules.”174
These early Canons focused on judicial demeanor. For instance, the Preamble
to the Canons declared that “[j]udges ought to be more learned than witty; more
reverent than plausible; and more advised than confident.”175 Rules regulating
judicial behavior were designed to assuage public concerns about judicial
discretion; in essence, judges were advised to apply the law “scientifically”
instead of deciding cases based on their own partialities.176
B. THE CURRENT ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT: INSUFFICIENT FOR
JUVENILE COURT

The ABA amended the judicial ethics codes in 1972, 1990, and 2007. Each
revision produced debates about the appropriate content of the Code.177 For
example, the goal of the 1972 revision was “to create bureaucratic divisions
between the judiciary and the political branches of government, preventing bias
in proceedings, and promoting the efficient administration of justice.”178 The
Code accordingly governed extra-judicial activities, including compensation for
those activities as well as financial dealings and personal interest disqualifications.179
The current version of the ABA Code specifies that the Code is intended to
apply to “anyone who is authorized to perform judicial functions, including an
officer such as a justice of the peace, magistrate, court commissioner, special
master, referee, or member of the administrative law judiciary.”180 The Code’s
provisions “are premised upon the supposition that a uniform system of ethical
principles should apply to all those authorized to perform judicial functions.”181
171. See id. at 517.
172. Id. at 514.
173. Id. at 518; see also Vincent R. Johnson, The Ethical Foundations of American Judicial Independence,
29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1007, 1013 n.33 (2002).
174. ALFINI ET AL., supra note 160, § 1.03, 1-5; see also Green & Roiphe, supra note 170, at 518.
175. Green & Roiphe, supra note 170, at 519 n.125 (“Judges ought to remember that their office is jus dicere
not jus dare; to interpret the law, and not to make the law, or to give law.”) (citing ABA Report of Committee on
Judicial Ethics (1923) (quoting Francis Bacon, Essay on Judicature)).
176. Id. at 519.
177. For a detailed explanation of the development of judicial ethics codes, see generally id.
178. Id. at 534.
179. Id.
180. ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, § I.B (2007).
181. ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, § I, cmt. 1 (2007).

2011]

JUDICIAL ETHICS IN JUVENILE COURT

119

While the Code does not reference the fact that the role of a juvenile court judge
is distinctly different from others who perform judicial functions, it does
recognize that judges in certain courts have distinct adjudicative responsibilities
from their more mainstream counterparts.
Specifically, the issue of alternative courts arose during the 2007 revisions as
“problem-solving” courts (such as drug courts, mental health courts, and
domestic violence courts) had become more common.182 Much like juvenile
court, the focus of problem-solving courts is not simply the adjudication of
individual cases; they are also intended to assist communities in solving social
problems.183 Unlike juvenile courts, however, alternative courts usually do not
wrestle with a historical tension between the goals of rehabilitation and
punishment.
Problem-solving courts involve different roles for a judge, who must serve as
“the leader of a team rather than a dispassionate arbitrator.”184 To bring a case to
resolution, judges in problem-solving courts hear information from a variety of
sources. The “defendant” is not always present for discussions, and judges are
encouraged to actively and directly seek information from individuals.185 As a
result, judges in problem-solving courts risk violating rules prohibiting ex parte
communications and other ethical rules.186 Like judges in juvenile court, judges
in these alternative courts are left with no specific ethical guidance for the unique
challenges of their courts.
As the ABA undertook the process that would ultimately result in the 2007
revised Model Code of Judicial Conduct, the Commission responsible for the
revision held thirteen public hearings. In the course of those hearings, commentators informed the Commission of the developing need for judicial guidance in
problem-solving courts.187
With no ethical guidelines existing for these particular circumstances, judges
in innovative courts hoped that “the new Code would address [the] issues and the
concerns that arise out of this new way of conducting court proceedings.”188
Unfortunately, the ABA fell short of adopting guidelines specifically for
alternative courts.189 The revised guidelines acknowledge that judges in these

182. See Louraine C. Arkfeld, Ethics for the Problem-Solving Court Judge: The New ABA Model Code, 28
JUST. SYS. J. 317 (2007). Specifically, the Code acknowledges the advent of these alternative courts, stating “[i]n
recent years many jurisdictions have created what are often called ‘problem solving’ courts, in which judges are
authorized by court rules to act in nontraditional ways.” ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, § I cmt.3
(2007).
183. See Arkfeld, supra note 182, at 317.
184. Id.
185. See id.
186. See id.
187. Id. at 318.
188. Id.
189. See Mark I. Harrison, The 2007 ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct: Blueprint for a Generation of
Judges, 28 JUST. SYS. J. 257, 264 (2007) (Though witnesses urged the Commission to create unique ethical rules
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types of courts work “outside the context of their usual judicial role as
independent decision makers on issues of fact and law.”190 But the Commission
left the problem of ethical guidance for these courts to the drafters of local rules:
“When local rules specifically authorize conduct not otherwise permitted under
these Rules, they take precedence over the provisions set forth in the Code.”191
By leaving these issues to be resolved at the state and local level, the ABA’s
reluctance to create ethical guidelines for the unique circumstances of nontraditional courts creates a dilemma for judges in these courts. The same problem
exists for juvenile court judges, who share characteristics of judges in both
traditional and problem-solving courts.
Without a single applicable code of ethics, state legislatures, individual
jurisdictions, and advocacy groups have filled in the gap with statutes, rules, and
training materials specifically designed for juvenile court judges. Thus, a juvenile
court judge faced with an ethical dilemma must consult multiple sources of
overlapping guidelines.192 In addition to the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct as
adopted by individual states, juvenile court judges are subject to state and local
rules of court,193 court administrative rules, and the Rules of Professional
Conduct for attorneys. Juvenile court judges are offered more guidance from
advocacy groups, such as the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court
Judges.194
Ironically, the ABA itself is involved with trainings for juvenile court judges as
part of the National Child Welfare Resource Center, which “provides free
training and technical assistance to agencies, courts, and attorneys on all legal
and judicial aspects of the child welfare system.”195 Furthermore, the ABA
Center on Children and the Law is developing a comprehensive set of “Judicial
Excellence Standards.” These standards will address court organization, judicial

for these courts, the Commission was “ultimately unwilling to do so because therapeutic courts are too
numerous and varied to enable the Commission to devise enforceable rules of general applicability for such
courts.”).
190. ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, § I cmt. 3 (2007). For instance, “judges presiding in drug
courts monitoring the progress of participants in those courts’ programs may be authorized and even encouraged
to communicate directly with social workers, probation officers, and others.” ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT, § I cmt. 3 (2007).
191. ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, § I cmt. 3 (2007).
192. See JUVENILE DELINQUENCY GUIDELINES, supra note 71, at 23 (National Council of Juvenile and Family
Court Judges advocates judicial collaboration but recognizes the potential conflict with ethical rules regarding
ex parte communication).
193. See, e.g., CAL. RULES OF COURT, Standard 5.40 (2009), available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/rules/
index.cfm?title⫽standards&linkid⫽standard5_40 (encouraging juvenile court judges to follow eleven “rules”
in addition to their adjudicatory duties).
194. See, e.g., JUVENILE DELINQUENCY GUIDELINES, supra note 71; NATIONAL JUVENILE DEFENDER CENTER,
MACARTHUR JUVENILE COURT TRAINING CURRICULUM (2000), available at http://www.njdc.info/macarthur2.php.
195. About Us, NAT’L CHILD WELFARE RESOURCE CENTER, http://www.abanet.org/child/rclji/aboutus.html
(last visited Oct. 6, 2010).
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selection and assignment, judicial administration, and judicial education.196 The
standards note that “[e]thics training is critical to help new judges understand the
responsibilities that come with hearing [juvenile court] cases and ensure that they
can comfortably embrace those responsibilities.”197 However, these standards
will have no influence on the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct. Thus, although one
arm of the ABA recognizes the importance of specific ethical guidance and
training for juvenile court judges, its own Code of Judicial Conduct does not.
Although these sorts of training materials are certainly useful, they provide
neither uniform standards nor common grounds for discipline of judges who fail
to follow such guidelines. Moreover, these many sources of guidance are
themselves indicative of a problem. Juvenile court judges are often overworked
in a system with minimal resources.198 These judges often do not have the time to
consider multiple sources of authority on a regular basis. As one Missouri judge
explained, “There are statutes that apply [to us], rules of evidence, civil
procedure, criminal procedure that apply . . . . We’ve got rules all over the
place.”199 Another judge commented, “[It] would be easier to have one set of
rules.”200 A diligent judge could consult multiple sources and still be unclear
about her ethical duties.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS: THE NEED FOR A REVISED ABA CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT FOR JUVENILE COURT
Although the Supreme Court, state legislatures, court participants, and the
public view juvenile court as “different,” the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct does
not. The fact that current codes of judicial conduct were not designed for—and
are not sufficient for—the special needs of juvenile court raises significant
concerns. Experts agree that the juvenile justice system requires additional
guidelines to improve the court’s practices.201 Judges themselves appreciate that
“there are times when our responsibilities perhaps require a little bit of deviation
from a strict code.”202 However, despite the fact that juvenile court judges face
different challenges than their counterparts in other courts, the country’s premier
source of judicial ethics guidelines does not recognize these differences.
Accordingly, the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct should be amended to include
provisions specifically for juvenile court judges. A simple, low-cost and practical
196. ABA CENTER ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW, JUDICIAL EXCELLENCE IN CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT
PROCEEDINGS: PRINCIPLES AND STANDARDS FOR COURT ORGANIZATION, JUDICIAL SELECTION AND ASSIGNMENT,
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, AND JUDICIAL EDUCATION (Sept. 2009) (manuscript on file with author).
197. Id at Standard D.1.
198. See supra note 151.
199. Telephone Interview with Martina Peterson, supra note 98.
200. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Missouri Juvenile Court Commissioner (Jan. 21, 2010).
201. See JUVENILE DELINQUENCY GUIDELINES, supra note 71, at 15. As one judge succinctly stated, “I think
there should be greater clarity.” Interview with the Honorable Donna Hitchens, supra note 106.
202. Id.
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revision would provide juvenile court judges with uniform guidelines suited to
their unique roles. To initiate this process, this article proposes amendments
related to three specific ethical issues facing juvenile court judges: ex parte
communications, competence, and decorum.
Critics may respond to these suggestions by arguing that the ABA’s Code was
drafted in an intentionally broad manner, allowing local jurisdictions to create
rules for specialized courts if they so choose. Unfortunately, this approach
assumes an activist local court that may not be present in all locations. Even in
jurisdictions that implement such rules, juvenile court judges are left to struggle
with a myriad of guidelines. As such, adjudications may vary widely from state to
state. A uniform model code tailored to the needs of juvenile court is therefore
necessary.
Some juvenile court judges may argue that they would prefer that ethical rules
treat them like any other judge in the context of ethics. However, this argument
fails to address the different roles and responsibilities of juvenile court judges.
Others may contend that simply revising a model Code of Judicial Conduct
cannot guarantee any substantive changes in the daily lives of judges and
litigants. It is certainly true that additional measures would likely need to be taken
after implementation of these code revisions, possibly including revised disciplinary procedures to increase accountability of juvenile court judges. The proposals
below should be viewed as a first step, encouraging ethical authorities to
recognize the distinctions inherent in juvenile court and thereby simplify the role
of judges.
A. EX PARTE COMMUNICATIONS

One area requiring revision for juvenile court judges is ex parte communications. The current ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, like every set of Model
Codes before it, prohibits ex parte communications.203 These communications
can be defined as those that “involve fewer than all of the parties who are legally
entitled to be present during the discussion of any matter.”204
The purpose of the ex parte prohibition is to ensure that no party gains an
advantage by presenting information to a judicial decision maker without notice
to all other parties.205 In this way, every person who has an interest in a legal
proceeding may be afforded the right to be heard.206 In addition, allowing ex
parte communications—even if a judge correctly decides a case with no undue

203. ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.9(A) (2007), available at http://www.abanet.org/
judicialethics/ABA_MCJC_approved.pdf. The Code provides that “a judge shall not initiate, permit, or
consider ex parte communications.” ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.9(A) (2007).
204. ALFINI ET. AL., supra note 160, § 5.02, 5-2.
205. See Leslie W. Abramson, The Judicial Ethics of Ex Parte and Other Communications, 37 HOUS. L. REV.
1343, 1355 (2000).
206. See id.
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influence—could undermine public confidence in an impartial judiciary.207
At the same time, ex parte communications are sometimes necessary.208
Accordingly, the Code establishes exceptions to the ex parte ban in particular
circumstances. For example, a judge may communicate ex parte for “scheduling,
administrative, or emergency purposes,” provided the judge “reasonably believes” no party will gain an advantage in the case and the judge promptly notifies
all parties of the communication.209 Exceptions also exist for soliciting written
advice from a “disinterested expert,” consulting with court staff, and conferences
related to settling a case.210
Furthermore, the Code allows a judge to “initiate, permit, or consider” ex parte
communications “when expressly authorized by law to do so.”211 In the comment
following the rule, the Code explains that these circumstances include service
“on therapeutic or problem-solving courts, mental health courts, or drug courts”
in which judges “assume a more interactive role” with parties, probation officers,
social workers, and others.212
This exception is particularly interesting, since the Code defines the term
“law” as encompassing “court rules as well as statutes, constitutional provisions,
and decisional law.”213 In this way, the ABA allowed various other authorities—
court administrators, state legislatures, judges creating precedential case law214—to
carve out exceptions to the ex parte prohibition should they choose to do so.215
This broad provision has created significant inconsistencies among jurisdictions. For example, judges in one drug court created a “waiver” process requiring
defendants to consent to judges’ considerations of ex parte communications in

207. See id. at 1356.
208. See generally JUVENILE DELINQUENCY GUIDELINES, supra note 71, at 23 (discussing how juvenile court
judges must balance community and system collaboration with ex parte restrictions).
209. ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.9(A)(1)(a)-(b) (2007), available at http://www.abanet.org/
judicialethics/ABA_MCJC_approved.pdf.
210. ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.9(A)(2)-(4) (2007), available at http://www.abanet.org/
judicialethics/ABA_MCJC_approved.pdf.
211. ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.9(A)(5) (2007), available at http://www.abanet.org/
judicialethics/ABA_MCJC_approved.pdf.
212. ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.9 cmt. 4 (2007), available at http://www.abanet.org/
judicialethics/ABA_MCJC_approved.pdf. While drafting this Comment, the ABA Commission considered
testimony about the ways in which alternative court adjudications can be “in tension with the requirement that
judges be and appear impartial and with traditional rules governing ex parte communications.” Mark I.
Harrison, The 2007 ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct: Blueprint for a Generation of Judges, 28 JUST. SYS.
J. 257, 264 (2007).
213. ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, terminology (2007), available at http://www.abanet.org/
judicialethics/ABA_MCJC_approved.pdf.
214. See, e.g., In re W.T.L., 656 A.2d 1123 (D.C. Ct. App. 1995).
215. See Abramson, supra note 205, at 1384 (“The scope of an ‘authorized by law’ exception includes
constitutional, statutory, and state and local rule provisions, as well as court orders or judicial decisions
expressly permitting communications in the absence of any or all counsel.”).
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exchange for admission to the drug court.216 In this instance, judges are deciding
for themselves whether they are allowed to communicate in an ex parte manner.
California already provides a limited exception to the ex parte prohibition for
child custody proceedings, allowing such communication between court child
custody mediators and attorneys or the court.217
In 2008, the Idaho Supreme Court added a provision to amend the state’s
judicial ethics codes to permit a judge presiding in a criminal or juvenile
problem-solving court to engage in ex parte communications with “members of
the problem-solving court team at staffings” and through written documentation.218 Notably, a judge involved with ex parte communications regarding a
defendant or juvenile in such a case cannot later preside over “termination
proceedings, probation violation proceedings or sentencing in that case,”
ostensibly to limit any potential for bias and preserve due process safeguards.219
In this way, the Idaho approach recognizes that ex parte conversations can
sometimes be useful, but should not be a determining factor in the resolution of a
case.
Although elements of juvenile court arguably fall into the “problem-solving
court” category, whether ex parte communications should be allowed in juvenile
court is subject to dispute.220 The unique nature of juvenile court suggests that
judges in this court should not be subject to the same ex parte ban as all other
judges. After all, ex parte communications forbidden in most courts could enable
a juvenile court judge to obtain necessary information about a child or family
history, particularly since juvenile court judges are encouraged to comprehensively engage with extra-judicial individuals such as caseworkers, school
counselors, and law enforcement officials.221
216. J. Vincent Aprile II, The Error of Legitimizing Ex Parte Communications, 18-SPG CRIM. JUST. 60, 61
(2003).
217. CAL. R. CT. 5.235(d) (2009); see also CAL. FAMILY CODE § 216. Not all ex parte communications will
negatively impact a court proceeding. See, e.g., In re W.T.L., 656 A.2d 1123 (D.C. Ct. App. 1995) (juvenile
court judge’s ex parte communication regarding a juvenile delinquent appearing before the judge was deemed
harmless error).
218. IDAHO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(B)(7)(f) (2008), available at http://www.judicialcouncil.
idaho.gov/code.pdf; see also AM. UNIV. JUSTICE PROGRAMS OFFICE, SCH. OF PUB. AFFAIRS, Frequently Asked
Questions Series: Drug Court Policies Regarding the Conduct and Confidentiality of Staffings (Oct. 23, 2009),
available at http://www1.spa.american.edu/justice/documents/2648.pdf; Michael Henderson, Ex Parte Communications—Adapting an Adversarial Rule to the Problem-Solving Setting, THE ADVOCATE (Idaho), Vol. 51, 48-9
(Sept. 2008). “Staffing” is defined as “a regularly scheduled, informal conference not occurring in open court,
the purpose of which is to permit the presiding judge and others, including counsel, to discuss a participant’s
progress in the problem solving court, treatment recommendations, or responses to participant compliance
issues.” IDAHO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(B)(7) Explanation, available at http://www.isc.idaho.gov/
links/Order%20Explanation.pdf.
219. Henderson, supra note 218, at 48-9.
220. See discussion supra Part III.A regarding juvenile courts as “different” and possessing unique purposes.
221. See CAL. R. CT., Standard 5.40 (2009) (encouraging juvenile court judges to confer with public law
office leaders and various public agencies that serve at-risk children, and maintain close liaison with school
authorities).
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Additionally, as discussed in Part III.B, supra, juvenile delinquency court
judges play a different role than judges in adult court. Juvenile court judges are
responsible not only for deciding individual cases, but are also expected to be
involved with community and juvenile justice system collaboration.222 Concern
about violating ex parte rules could discourage judges from collaborative efforts
that would be consistent with the purpose of juvenile court. One judge noted, “If
I’m not allowed to ask questions, if I can’t be involved, how can I do justice” in
juvenile court?223
Conversely, allowing juvenile court judges to communicate ex parte presents a
risk that a youth could suffer from an unfair or biased hearing.224 The Supreme
Court held in Gault that juvenile court participants are entitled to fundamental
fairness in their court proceedings.225 If a judge is permitted to have ex parte
conversations with caseworkers or government attorneys regarding elements of a
youth’s delinquency case, the youth could be at a disadvantage; this situation
would raise obvious due process concerns.
Moreover, whenever one counsel has access to the judge and opposing counsel
does not, the “appearance of impropriety is immediately present.”226 This factor
is particularly important in juvenile delinquency proceedings. Given the extreme
judicial discretion discussed in Part V.C, infra, juvenile court judges should
arguably be held to the strictest ethical guidelines possible.
The ABA evaded the opportunity to clarify the application of the ex parte
prohibition to juvenile court judges. Instead, the vague standard “expressly
authorized by law” enables judges to engage in ex parte communications in a
variety of circumstances. Theoretically, the ABA would permit juvenile court
judges (like judges in drug court)227 to engage in ex parte discussions if they
choose to do so; all that would be required is a declaration to that effect by a
presiding judge of a juvenile court.228 While there may be some benefits to
allowing individual jurisdictions to create their own rules, this approach could
eventually lead to inconsistent regulations regarding one of the most important
concepts in judicial ethics. The ABA’s credibility is also at risk if its nearly

222. See discussion, supra Part III.B. A 2008 study by California’s Administrative Office of the Courts found
that eighty-five percent of judicial officers in juvenile court meet with other “justice partners” regularly, and one
third of bench officers interviewed believe that courts should meet with them more often; see also JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY GUIDELINES, supra note 71, at 25.
223. Interview with the Honorable Donna Hitchens, supra note 106 (Judges are “constantly on a tightrope:
What can we say, what can’t we say?”).
224. Cf. Aprile, supra note 216, at 62 (discussing ex parte communications in the context of drug court
proceedings).
225. Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 45, at 558.
226. Compare Aprile, supra note 216, at 60, with ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1
available at http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/ABA_MCJC_approved.pdf (requiring that judges avoid both
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety).
227. See Aprile, supra note 216, at 62.
228. Of course, such a declaration may run afoul of particular state or local judicial conduct rules.
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century-long ban on ex parte communications can be so casually disregarded in
some courts.
To prevent this, the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct should acknowledge the
complicated situations of juvenile court judges regarding ex parte communications. As discussed above, the Idaho rule recognizes different judicial roles in
juvenile court: Ex parte conversations are allowed when the judge is acting in a
problem-solving manner, but that judge is then forbidden from presiding in the
ultimate sentencing disposition in that case. This approach protects the individual
minor from any disadvantage as a result of the ex parte communications, but also
preserves the juvenile court judge’s ability to collaborate with other service
providers.
The ABA should amend the current Model Code to provide more guidance to
juvenile court (and other problem-solving court) judges. The amended provision
should provide:
Rule 2.9(A): “A judge may not initiate, permit, or consider ex parte
communications, or consider other communications made to the judge outside
the presence of the parties or their lawyers, concerning a pending or impending
matter, except as follows:
(6) When a juvenile court judge is serving in a problem-solving capacity. This
capacity includes presiding over a juvenile diversion court or working with a
court team to resolve a case through alternative sentencing. If a case is not
resolved at the problem-solving stage, a judge who has received ex parte
communications shall not preside over dispositions or probation proceedings
in that case.”229
B. COMPETENCE

Like the prohibition against ex parte communications, judicial competence has
been an essential element of every code of judicial conduct.230 The 2007 Model
Code requires every judge to be competent, meaning judges must perform
judicial and administrative duties with “the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness,
and preparation reasonably necessary.”231 For instance, the Missouri Supreme
Court established its test for judicial incompetence as “whether the conduct at
issue establishes that the [judge] lacks the requisite ability, knowledge, judgment,
or diligence to consistently and capably discharge the duties of the office he or

229. Proposed amendments are italicized.
230. See ALFINI ET AL., supra note 160, § 1.03, 1-9 (citing ABA MODEL CODE Canon 3A(1) (1972)); ABA
MODEL CODE Canon 3(A)(2)(1990); ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.5 (2007), available at
http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/ABA_MCJC_approved.pdf.
231. ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.5 cmt. 1 (2007), available at http://www.abanet.org/
judicialethics/ABA_MCJC_approved.pdf.
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she holds.”232
Although every judge has a duty to fulfill his or her obligations with
competence, the term has a broader meaning for judges in courts dealing with
specialized populations. For example, as discussed above, juvenile court judges
are required to be community educators in addition to serving the role of
adjudicators. Despite the clear need for additional definitions of “competence,”
the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct does not specifically address any of the
additional competency factors required of juvenile court judges.
For that reason, state and local court rules and training manuals require
juvenile court judges to be educated in a wide variety of areas.233 In addition to a
thorough understanding of juvenile law, delinquency judges must be trained in
theories of human development and family and group dynamics, as well as have
knowledge of available community or government resources.234 Furthermore,
concepts relating to psychological development of youth, such as those utilized
by the Supreme Court in Roper, have become necessary elements of a juvenile
court judge’s competence: Judges should “fully understand and appreciate the
stages of child development, the educational needs of children at various stages
in their development, and child behavioral issues.”235
A juvenile court judge may be trained in these factors by local authorities or
advocacy groups, and a judge without this expansive knowledge would
undoubtedly be deemed incompetent by ethical authorities.236 However, this
specialized knowledge is not specifically mentioned by the ABA Code as part of
the ethical obligation to be “competent.” While some may argue that this training
is included within the “reasonably necessary” language of the ABA Code,237 this
vague approach does not sufficiently encompass the training necessary for
juvenile court judges. Indeed, the failure of the Code to acknowledge these
expanded training factors as necessary for judicial competence in juvenile court
represents a flaw in the ethical scheme. Juvenile court judges seeking clarification
of their ethical duty of competence should not have to look to outside training
manuals for guidance.

232. In re Baber, 847 S.W.2d 800, 803 (Mo. 1993) (en banc); see also In re Hunter, 823 So.2d 325, 336 (La.
2002) (adopting the In re Baber definition of judicial competence).
233. See generally JUVENILE DELINQUENCY GUIDELINES, supra note 71.
234. Edwards, supra note 6, at 36; see also Burnett, Sr., supra note 119, at 8 (juvenile court judges “should
receive[] specialized training, which is comprehensive and multidisciplinary”).
235. Burnett, Sr., supra note 119, at 8. The use of psychological evidence in juvenile court has been
thoroughly considered in the legal literature. See, e.g., Terry Maroney, The False Promise of Adolescent Brain
Science in Juvenile Justice, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 89 (2009); Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso,
Symposium on the Future of Juvenile Court: The Evolution of Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective on
Juvenile Justice Reform, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137 (1997).
236. See Edwards, supra note 6, at 36 (1992) (arguing for the need for such training under the chapter title
“Retaining Competent Judges”).
237. ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.5 cmt. 1 (2007), available at http://www.abanet.org/
judicialethics/ABA_MCJC_approved.pdf.
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Second, the rotating nature of juvenile court assignments in some jurisdictions
undermines judicial competence. Julian Mack noted in 1909 that “[i]n some very
important jurisdictions the vicious practice is indulged in of assigning a different
judge to the juvenile-court work every month or every three months. It is
impossible for these judges to gain the necessary experience or to devote the
necessary time to the study of new problems.”238 Because of the challenging
nature of juvenile court, judges in some jurisdictions are asked to serve a
minimum term on the juvenile bench. For example, California rules indicate a
preference for juvenile court judges to serve a minimum of three years in a
juvenile court assignment, with priority given to those who expressed an interest
in that court.239 Some jurisdictions require five-year terms.240
Minimum term requirements reflect an understanding that the “expertise
necessary” to be a successful juvenile court judge “can come only from years on
the job.”241 Although a juvenile court judge who serves on the bench for more
than two to three years “understands a lot of things by osmosis,” not all
jurisdictions mandate long-term assignments for juvenile court judges.242 As a
result, “by the time [judges] understand [what is required], they are gone and
someone new is in.”243 The high learning curve in juvenile court, combined with
the level of judicial competence expected in a courtroom, requires that judges
commit to serving minimum terms on the bench. Of course, judges should take
care to avoid any inadvertent biases resulting from too many years on the bench
as described in Part III.C.
Third, the Code does not require judges to consider cultural factors as part of
their judicial competency obligation. Cultural competency has become increasingly important in juvenile court because children of color are overrepresented in
the juvenile justice system.244 Indeed, “African American and Latino/a youth
experience stereotyping and consequent discrimination at every step of the

238. Julian Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 119 (1909).
239. CAL. R. CT., Standard 5.40(a) (2009), available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/rules/index.cfm?
title⫽standards&linkid⫽standard5_40.
240. Edwards, supra note 6, at 37.
241. Id. at 36-37 (1992) (“To review the duties and responsibilities . . . is to understand why the juvenile
court judge must remain in the position for a substantial number of years in order to be effective.”)
242. Telephone Interview with Anonymous California retired Juvenile Court Judge (Jan. 25, 2010).
243. Telephone Interview with Martina Peterson, supra note 98.
244. See Perry Moriearty, Combating the Color-Coded Confinement of Kids: An Equal Protection Remedy,
32 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 285, 289 (2008) (“Over the last thirty years, a number of increasingly
sophisticated analyses have documented a statistically significant ‘race effect’ on juvenile justice outcomes.”);
Margaret Olesnavage, Disproportionate Representation of Children of Color in the Child Welfare and Juvenile
Justice Systems in Michigan, MICH. B. J. 26 (Jan. 2010) (“Youth of color are overrepresented at nearly every
point of contact with the juvenile justice system.”); Miriam Stohs, Racism in the Juvenile Justice System: A
Critical Perspective, 2 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 97, 109-10 (2003) (discussion of statistics illustrating
racial discrepancies at every stage of the juvenile justice process); see also discussion, infra Part V.C.
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[juvenile justice] intake and adjudication process.”245 Judges who are culturally
insensitive to the needs of children of color risk alienating youth and families in
their courtrooms. This lack of understanding could produce unnecessary hostility
or resistance in a youth against a judge’s authority.246 Moreover, a judge’s
inability to understand the dynamics of a minor’s cultural background could
result in inappropriate sentencing: A judge who does not appreciate the influence
of a youth’s culture might not recognize the particular mitigating circumstances
that led to the offense, or the proper placement to rehabilitate the youth.
Increasing cultural competence may require additional training for juvenile
court judges. As one juvenile court judge explained:
[W]e need more diversity training to alleviate stereotypes and ignorance. We
need more relationship training on how to interact with people and communicate better. We need training on the dynamics in the courtroom and how we are
perceived by other people. We, as [juvenile court] judges[,] also need training
on dealing with certain types of people and their level of functioning. This
“real” training isn’t something that we are normally taught in workshops that
judges are required to attend, but it is vital to address the public in the role that
we fill.247

Despite the need for cultural competency in juvenile court, the ABA Code
acknowledges none of these factors in its definition of “competence.” Thus, the
ABA should amend the definition of “competence” specifically for juvenile court
judges. The expanded comment to Rule 2.5 should provide:
Comment [5]: Juvenile Court judges should serve a minimum of three years on
the juvenile court bench. Juvenile court judges must be aware of available
community or social service resources for youth.248 Juvenile court judges
should seek annual or bi-annual training in the areas of juvenile psychological
development, family dynamics, and cultural sensitivity.
C. BIAS, DEMEANOR AND DECORUM

As the Supreme Court noted in Gault, judges were historically allowed
expansive discretion in the disposition of cases in juvenile court.249 Judicial
discretion is consistent with the rehabilitative purpose of juvenile court, since the
“treatment” concept “necessarily entails individual differentiation.”250 Although
juvenile court may be shifting in a more formal and punitive direction, juvenile

245. ANNE E. CASEY FOUNDATION, RACE MATTERS: UNEQUAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE 2 (2006),
available at http://www.aecf.org/upload/publicationfiles/fact_sheet12.pdf.
246. JUVENILE DELINQUENCY GUIDELINES, supra note 71, at 49.
247. E-mail from Martina Peterson, supra note 109.
248. Proposed amendments are italicized.
249. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 18 (1967).
250. Feld, supra note 9, at 91.

130

THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS

[Vol. 24:97

court judges still have more discretion than judges in adult criminal or civil
court.251 Indeed, juvenile court judges recognize that they have an unusual degree
of discretion.252
Discretion enables juvenile court judges to balance many applicable factors in
a juvenile court proceeding. For instance, judges are able to consider factors such
as a youthful offender’s family history, educational background, and current state
of the offender’s home life. As a necessary part of the juvenile justice model,
discretion enables a judge to sentence juvenile offenders in a way that will serve
their best interests.
However, as mentioned above, the discretion granted to judges in juvenile
court creates the potential for unethical judicial conduct. In the closed and private
world of juvenile court, judicial discretion can “pose[] a threat to both the child’s
individual liberties and the public welfare.”253 The corruption of Judge Ciavarella in Pennsylvania, as discussed above, is one highly publicized example of
the potential abuse of power in a discretionary court.
Less publicized, but no less significant, are concerns raised by the prevalence
of bench trials in juvenile court. In these trials, “[f]ormal rules are virtually
non-existent and the judge can consider practically any type of evidence deemed
necessary without allowing for cross-examination of witnesses.”254 In an
environment of broad judicial discretion and relaxed evidentiary rules, evidence
can be considered that may or may not actually relate to the determination of a
youth’s guilt or innocence.255 A review of case law by Professors Martin
Guggenheim and Randy Hertz suggested that juvenile court judges used their
discretion to “often convict on evidence so scant that only the most closedminded or misguided juror could think the evidence satisfied the standard of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”256 Even so, because most appellate courts
rarely reverse bench trial convictions, juveniles were at risk of excessive
sentences.257

251. See Stohs, supra note 244, at 104 (“In spite of the shift to more formal and punitive proceedings, the
modern juvenile justice system continues to function with greater informality and discretion, relative to the
adult system, at every step of the process.”); see also Harris, supra note 69, at 390 (“[D]espite the introduction
of formal legal criteria to guide judicial decisions, judges still have some discretion in the ways that they
characterize both offenses and offenders in their sentencing decisions, even if the discretion is somewhat
abridged.”).
252. Interview with the Honorable Donna Hitchens, supra note 106.
253. Drizin & Luloff, supra note 31, at 319.
254. Stohs, supra note 244, at 107.
255. Id. at 106 (citing BARRY KRISBERG & JAMES F. AUSTIN, REINVENTING JUVENILE JUSTICE at 79).
256. Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 45, at 564 (providing “examples of cases in which a juvenile court
judge convicted an alleged delinquent on evidence that an appellate court easily found to be insufficient”). For
example, in a Washington case cited by Professors Guggenheim and Hertz, a “trial judge convicted a juvenile of
aiding and abetting animal cruelty in the second degree based solely on evidence ‘that he was present and
giggled while another boy threw a pigeon into a fountain.’” Id. at 565 (internal citations omitted).
257. Id. at 566-67 (“[A] review of the cases in which insufficiency claims failed readily reveals numerous
instances in which the vast majority of ‘reasonable factfinders’ would have acquitted.”).
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Of course, the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct forbids bias on the bench. Judges
are advised to perform their duties without bias, prejudice or harassment based
upon a variety of factors: race, sex, gender, religion, national origin, ethnicity,
disability, age, sexual orientation, marital status, socio-economic status, and
political affiliation.258 The ABA identified helpful examples of the manifestation
of bias or prejudice, such as epithets, slurs, demeaning nicknames, and
“threatening, intimidating, or hostile acts.”259
While the ABA’s prohibition against bias is useful, it does not acknowledge the
distinctive risks of bias that exist in juvenile court. Juvenile court’s “unbridled”260 discretion and informal procedures present a heightened possibility of
judicial bias, since discretion can constitute “a euphemism for idiosyncratic
judicial subjectivity.”261 Not all cases of judicial bias are deliberate; for example,
as discussed above, bias can inadvertently result from years of experience on the
bench. However, a risk exists that judges will decide cases or sentence youth
differently based on their own personal preferences or prejudices.
A biased judge may make determinations based on “extraneous personal
characteristics for which [the youth] bear no responsibility.”262 In one illustrative
example, a juvenile court judge in Tennessee was publicly censured for his habit
of ruling against immigrant juveniles “based solely on the real or perceived
immigration status” of the children or their parents.263 In a formal Letter of
Reprimand, the Court of the Judiciary noted that this judge’s actions displayed “a
perceived predetermination as to Hispanic individuals appearing before [him].”264
Statistical evidence demonstrating racial disparities throughout the juvenile
justice system make bias concerns all the more troubling.265 For example,
African American adolescents, particularly males with mental health issues, are
more likely to be referred to a juvenile delinquency court than a treatment

258. ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.3(A)-(B) (2007), available at http://www.abanet.org/
judicialethics/ABA_MCJC_approved.pdf.
259. ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.3 cmt. 2 (2007), available at http://www.abanet.org/
judicialethics/ABA_MCJC_approved.pdf.
260. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 18 (1967).
261. Feld, supra note 9, at 91.
262. Id. at 91-92.
263. John Lamb, Formal Rreprimand for Dickson County Juvenile Court Judge who Overemphasized
Immigration, HISPANIC NASHVILLE (May 29, 2008, 6:24 AM), available at http://www.hispanicnashville.com/
2008/05/formal-reprimand-for-dickson-county.html.
264. Formal Letter of Reprimand from the Honorable Don R. Ash, Presiding Judge, Tennessee Court of the
Judiciary, to the Honorable A. Andrew Jackson, Dickson Cnty. Gen. Sessions Judge, (May 16, 2008), available
at http://www.tba2.org/tbatoday/news/2008/judicialreprimand_051608.pdf. For additional cases of bias on the
juvenile court bench, see In re Joseph P. Esworthy, 1990 WL 656123 (N.Y. Comm’n Judicial Conduct 1990)
(juvenile court judge removed from bench for making inappropriate comments during a juvenile delinquency
proceeding); In re Raymond E. Aldrickh, Jr., 1982 WL 196852 (N.Y. Comm’n Judicial Conduct 1982) (judge
removed from juvenile court bench for using “profane, improper and menacing language,” making
“inappropriate racial references,” and “otherwise [behaving] in an inappropriate and degrading manner”).
265. See supra note 244.
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system.266 In 2007-2008, African American students in Florida were two and a
half times more likely than white students to be arrested and referred to the
juvenile justice system.267 Mexican Americans and other immigrant groups are
more likely to suffer from “treatable, yet untreated” mental illnesses, a major
cause of the types of behavior landing youth in delinquency court proceedings.268
Moreover, Latino students in Colorado were fifty percent more likely than white
students to be referred to law enforcement in 2006-2008.269 Juvenile court judges
thus have great discretion in a system with a disproportionate representation of
youth of color, which could allow personal racial bias or prejudice to have an
enhanced role in adjudications.
Gender bias is also a concern, especially given the rising involvement of girls
in the juvenile justice system. The arrest rates for girls increased thirty-five
percent between 1980 and 2000, while the arrest rates for boys decreased.270
Indeed, gender bias is a “principal culprit in girls’ continued and growing
presence” in the juvenile justice system.271 Bias on the part of judges can
“extend[] in both directions”; some girls may be able to “sweet-talk” judges in an
attempt to “manipulate the system,” while others may be treated more harshly.272
Moreover, as noted earlier, the Harris study found that some judges with high
career ambitions are interested in being promoted beyond the juvenile court.273
Some judges may hold a bias toward the prosecution in order to curry favor for
the fulfillment of their own aspirations or to prevent the appearance of being “soft
on crime.”274 Or in jurisdictions with a powerful public defender office, judges
may decide cases in favor of the defense for the same reason. Either way, judges
in juvenile court have more discretion than judges in adult courts to act on such
biases.
As an integral part of juvenile court proceedings, judicial discretion should not
be eliminated. However, although judicial bias is difficult to quantify, the
possibility of bias in this court with broad judicial discretion should be more
thoroughly examined. Unlike adult courts, the decisions of juvenile court judges

266. JUVENILE DELINQUENCY GUIDELINES, supra note 71, at 49.
267. ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, TEST, PUNISH, AND PUSH OUT: HOW “ZERO TOLERANCE” AND HIGH-STAKES
TESTING FUNNEL YOUTH INTO THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE 19 (Jan. 2010), available at http://
www.advancementproject.org/sites/default/files/publications/01-EducationReport-2009v8-HiRes.pdf (internal
citations omitted).
268. JUVENILE DELINQUENCY GUIDELINES, supra note 71, at 50.
269. See ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, supra note 267, at 19.
270. Kim Taylor-Thompson, Girl Talk—Examining Racial and Gender Lines in Juvenile Justice, 6 NEV. L.J.
1137, 1137 (2006).
271. Id. at 1138.
272. Jennifer Thibodeau, Note, Sugar and Spice and Everything Nice: Female Juvenile Delinquency and
Gender Bias in Punishment and Behavior in Juvenile Courts, 8 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 489, 504-05
(2002).
273. Harris, supra note 69, at 404.
274. Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 45, at 569-70.
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impact a particularly vulnerable population and can irreparably determine the
course of a young litigant’s future.
Admittedly, any code of ethics is limited in its ability to truly regulate bias on
the bench. Indeed, it may be difficult for ethical authorities to eliminate bias
entirely in any courtroom, including juvenile court. Judges themselves may be in
denial about their personal biases. Hence, formal rules prohibiting bias are not
sufficient to address this problem; other procedural steps are necessary to ensure
unbiased behavior on the bench. Although a full examination of procedural
actions is beyond the scope of this Article, these measures could include
increased monitoring of judges and enforcement of rules through disciplinary
procedures.
To counteract the difficulties inherent in identifying and reducing bias, the
ABA Code may have stronger influence in a more measurable area: judicial
behavior. The Code already mandates proper judicial demeanor and decorum.275
Yet the vague provisions of the Code, designed to apply to any person in a
judicial capacity, do not specifically acknowledge the importance of judicial
demeanor in specialized courts with vulnerable populations. Accordingly, the
ABA should amend the Code of Conduct’s provisions regarding judicial
demeanor and decorum in the context of juvenile court.276
Judicial demeanor is receiving renewed attention in other areas. For example,
in response to complaints of judicial bias and incompetence on the immigration
bench, Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez ordered performance evaluations in
2006 that included an assessment as to whether new judicial appointees
“possess[] the appropriate judicial temperament . . . for the job.”277 The Attorney
General’s order suggested that “temperament” was an important element of
judicial competence for immigration judges.278 Similarly, applicants to the
juvenile court delinquency bench could be screened to ensure they have the
proper temperament to work directly with litigants in their specialized courts.
Juvenile court judges clearly have to walk a line between “reprimanding parent
and warm embracing judge,” depending on each individual case.279 Unlike civil
court, in which there is “no expressed emotion” by the judge, many judges

275. ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.8 (2007), available at http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/
ABA_MCJC_approved.pdf.
276. ROZIER E. SANCHEZ JUDICIAL EDUCATION CENTER OF NEW MEXICO (JEC), JUDICIAL ETHICS HANDBOOK
R. 7-310, available at http://jec.unm.edu/resources/judicial_handbook/ethics/ethics07.htm (“Demeanor and
decorum are no less important in the courts of limited jurisdiction than in the general jurisdiction courts.”).
277. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales Outlines Reforms for
Immigration Courts and Board of Immigration Appeals (Aug. 9, 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/
pr/2006/August/06_ag_520.html. For an analysis of judicial competence in the context of immigration judges,
see Benedetto, supra note 66.
278. Benedetto, supra note 277, at 507.
279. Interview with the Honorable Donna Hitchens, supra note 106 (Judges can sometimes be “Dr. Jekyll
and Mr. Hyde” from one case to the next.).
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believe “emotion is needed in juvenile court.”280 One juvenile court judge
reported that she has a “completely different demeanor in a juvenile case” for
several reasons.281 Echoing the Supreme Court in Roper, this judge recognizes
that a child’s “cognitive reasoning” does not develop until his or her late teens.282
In addition, because “kids are scared,” speaking in a “calm tone of voice” will
reduce the likelihood of tantrums or frustration in her courtroom.283 Another
judge noted that he takes care when there are siblings in his courtroom by
“making eye contact with all siblings equally so they don’t think you are treating
them unequally.”284
Improper judicial demeanor can have a substantial effect on court participants.
An evaluation prepared for the Idaho Supreme Court Child Protection Committee
found that youth in juvenile court proceedings did not feel they were taken
seriously in court, and did not feel they were engaged in the court process.285 The
youth reported that their experience in court “was ‘scary,’ that they felt ‘stressed
out,’ or that ‘it was embarrassing to talk in front of all those people.’”286 The
youth recommended that they should be treated with more “respect and courtesy”
in court.287 These findings suggest that more attention should be paid to the
actions of judges during juvenile court proceedings.
The ABA Code could provide the catalyst for an increased focus on judicial
behavior by considering broader components of demeanor and decorum in the
context of juvenile court judges.
The amended Code should read:
Rule 2.8(B)(1): A juvenile court judge should consider the varied levels of
cognitive development in youth while addressing litigants. Juvenile court
judges must maintain a respectful demeanor and calm temperament with youth
offenders, their families, and victims at all times during juvenile court
proceedings.288

VI. CONCLUSION
Those who choose to sit on the juvenile court bench accept a challenging role
in a complicated court. The purpose of juvenile court may be moving toward a

280. Id.
281. Telephone Interview with Martina Peterson, supra note 98.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Missouri Juvenile Court Commissioner (Jan. 21, 2010).
285. See IDAHO SUPREME CT. CHILD PROTECTION COMM., INVOLVING FOSTER YOUTH AND FOSTER PARENTS IN
CHILD PROTECTION PROCEEDINGS: A PROCESS EVALUATION OF IDAHO JUVENILE RULE 40, 3 (2009), available at
http://www.isc.idaho.gov/Involving%20Foster%20Youth%20and%20Foster%20Parents%20in%20Child%20
Protection%20Proceedings.pdf. The report focused on dependency proceedings in five Idaho counties. Id. at 1.
286. Id. at 44.
287. Id. at 40.
288. Proposed amendments are italicized.

2011]

JUDICIAL ETHICS IN JUVENILE COURT

135

more punitive model, but the rehabilitative nature of the court is still prevalent.
This purpose sets the court apart from adult criminal court. Similarly, although
some constitutional protections exist for juvenile offenders, procedures in
juvenile court remain more informal and more dependent on judicial discretion.
Delinquency judges retain the ability to place youth in more flexible placements
than those available to adult offenders. Juvenile court judges are expected to
assume a greater role as educators in the community. In sum, juvenile court is
unique.
One would never recognize, however, the unique nature of juvenile court by
reviewing the ethical guidelines applied to juvenile court judges. The ABA Code
of Judicial Conduct, intended to apply to anyone performing judicial functions,
ignores the distinct challenges faced by adjudicators in juvenile court.289 Juvenile
court judges should not be forced to consult multiple training manuals from
various sources when confronted with an ethical challenge. Rather, the ABA Code
should be amended to reflect the needs of these judges.
This revision process does not necessitate an amendment of the entire Code;
alterations of provisions that are particularly relevant to juvenile court would be a
cost-effective and simple way to provide additional guidance. To that end, this
article recommends modifications to the provisions governing ex parte communications, judicial competence, and judicial demeanor and decorum. By clarifying
the ethical standards for juvenile court judges, these amendments also acknowledge the attempts of juvenile court founders to create a special system for the
adjudication of youthful offenders.
The responsibility to ensure an ethical bench in juvenile court lies within every
member of society. As Judge Julian Mack noted more than one hundred years
ago, the work of this court “demands the united and aroused efforts of the whole
community, bent on keeping children from becoming criminals, determined that
those who are treading the downward path shall be halted and led back.”290
Ultimately, the implementation of ethical guidelines tailored for this specialized
court will reinforce judges’ abilities to determine the best outcomes for our
society’s youth.

289. See generally ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, application I.B (2007), available at
http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/ABA_MCJC_approved.pdf.
290. Julian Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 122 (1909).

